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A SPORTING CHANCE: BIEDIGER V.
QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY AND WHAT
CONSTITUTES A SPORT FOR PURPOSES OF
TITLE IX
JAMES J. HEFFERAN, JR.*

I. INTRODUCTION
At the 2012 Summer Olympics in London, women comprised over half the
members of the United States Olympic team.1 Female athletes accounted for
fifty-eight medals, which represented fifty-six percent of the United States’ total
medal count of 104.2 These totals stand in stark contrast to the 1972 Summer
Olympics in Munich, where American women won only twenty-two medals,
representing twenty-three percent of the American total.3 What accounts for the
remarkable growth in female athletic participation and success over this
forty-year period? The obvious answer is that this period coincides with the
enactment of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.4
“Title IX . . . is widely recognized as the source of [the] vast expansion of
athletic opportunities for women in the nation’s schools and universities . . . .”5
* James J. Hefferan, Jr., BA in Political Science, with highest distinction, from the University of
Michigan in 1999, and a JD, magna cum laude, from Wake Forest University in 2003. He is currently
an Assistant Professor of Law at the Charlotte School of Law, where he teaches Sales, Secured
Transactions, Contracts, Contract Drafting, Amateur Sports Law, and Constitutional Law. He would
like to thank the staff of the Marquette Sports Law Review for making the publication process efficient
and seamless. This Article became a far more voluminous and time-consuming project than he had
originally envisioned, so he would like to thank his colleague, Megan Annitto, and his uncle, John
Johnston, for their subtle (and sometimes not so subtle) encouragement in seeing it through to
completion. Finally, he would like to dedicate this Article to Colleen.
1. MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 771 (3d ed. 2013).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2016).
5. Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 2010); see also
McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 286 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The
participation of girls and women in high school and college sports has increased dramatically since
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In 1972, the year Title IX was enacted, only 30,000 women participated in
collegiate varsity or recreational sports.6 By the 2011–2012 school year,
195,657 women participated in intercollegiate athletics sponsored by the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).7
Not only has Title IX “had a tremendous impact on women’s opportunities
in intercollegiate athletics,” it has also “enabled women to reap the myriad
benefits of participation in athletic programs.”8 Courts have long recognized
the manifold benefits student-athletes derive from participating in sports:
For college students, athletics offers [sic] an opportunity to
exacuate [sic] leadership skills, learn teamwork, build
self-confidence, and perfect self-discipline. In addition, for
many student-athletes, physical skills are a passport to college
admissions and scholarships, allowing them to attend
otherwise inaccessible schools. These opportunities, and the
lessons learned on the playing fields, are invaluable in
attaining career and life successes in and out of professional
sports.9
Ironically, given its significant contributions to female athletic
participation, Title IX itself does not specifically mention athletics. Rather, the
statute “require[s] the promulgation of regulations to achieve gender equity in
educational opportunities.”10 The resulting regulations require schools to
“provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes,” through
“selection of sports and levels of competition [which] effectively
accommodate the interests and [abilities] of members of both sexes[.]”11 Thus,
whether a school complies with Title IX by offering equal athletic
opportunities to women turns in large part on whether the sports offered
effectively accommodate the interests of female students.
Title IX was enacted.”).
6. MITTEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 772.
7. Id. at 775. Throughout the 1970s, women athletes competed at the intercollegiate level under the
auspices of the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW). Id. at 772. “In 1980,
however, the NCAA began offering national championships for women” and effectively absorbed the
women’s athletics programs at its member institutions. Id. Following an unsuccessful antitrust suit
against the NCAA, the AIAW disbanded. Id.
8. Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 93–94 (D.D.C. 2003).
9. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 891 (1st Cir. 1993).
10. MITTEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 773.
11. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (2016).
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This, of course, begs the question of what exactly constitutes a sport for
purposes of the Title IX analysis. Surprisingly, there has been little guidance
from either courts or those individuals and agencies responsible for
enforcement of Title IX as to which athletic activities are considered sports for
Title IX compliance purposes.12 This is not merely an idle academic exercise.
As discussed in more detail later in the Article, adopting an overly-broad
definition of “sport” runs the risk of “watering-down” women’s sports for
purposes of Title IX compliance.13 In 2008, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR)
of the United States Department of Education (DOE) issued a policy letter that,
for the first time, directly addressed the question of what will be
considered a “sport” for purposes of Title IX compliance.14 Subsequently, in a
series of decisions issued between 2010 and 2013 in the case of Biediger v.
Quinnipiac University, the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
became the first federal courts to consider the analysis set forth in the 2008 OCR
Letter and to attempt to define “sport” within the context of Title IX.15
Part II of this Article explores in some detail the historical background of
Title IX. Particular attention is paid to the level of deference given by courts to
the regulations and various other pronouncements on the subject issued by the
relevant government agencies and individuals tasked with enforcing Title IX.
Part III analyzes the three Biediger decisions that directly address the
issue of what constitutes a “sport” for purposes of Title IX. Part IV discusses
the implications of the Biediger decisions for future Title IX litigation.
Finally, this Article concludes that the Biediger decisions represent an
appropriate balancing of the relevant factors and provide an important bulwark
against the temptation of schools to take short cuts toward Title IX compliance
in these challenging economic times.

12. Ephraim Glatt, Defining “Sport” Under Title IX: Cheerleading, Biediger v. Quinnipiac
University, and the Proper Scope of Agency Deference, 19 SPORTS L.J. 297, 298 (2012) (noting the
long-running debate among lawyers and academics regarding this issue).
13. Erin E. Buzuvis, The Feminist Case for the NCAA’s Recognition of Competitive Cheer as an
Emerging Sport for Women, 52 B.C. L. REV. 439, 464 (2011).
14. See Stephanie Monroe, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter, OFF. FOR
CIV. RTS., U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-20080917.pdf; see also Glatt, supra note 12, at 308.
15. See generally Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2012); Biediger v. Quinnipiac
Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414 (D. Conn. 2013); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.
Conn. 2010). The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut also issued another
decision granting the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction, an opinion beyond the scope of the present
analysis. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 616 F. Supp. 2d 277, 298 (D. Conn. 2009).
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A.

Enactment of Title IX

“Title IX was Congress’s response to significant concerns about
discrimination against women in education.”16 The hearings leading up to the
enactment of Title IX elicited over 1,200 pages of testimony, “documenting
‘massive, persistent patterns of discrimination against women’ in colleges and
universities.”17 Congress intended the statute to serve a dual purpose: “‘to avoid
the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices,’ and ‘to provide
individual citizens effective protection against those practices.’”18 Section 901
of Title IX provides, “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.”19
Interestingly, given the topic with which Title IX has subsequently
become most associated, the language of the statute itself makes no mention of
athletics. Rather, Title IX constitutes “a broad prohibition of gender-based
discrimination in all programmatic aspects of educational institutions.”20
Congress designed “[t]he statute [to] sketch[] wide policy lines, leaving the
details to regulating agencies.”21 Moreover, because Congress adopted Title IX
as a floor amendment, Title IX lacks the usual committee report and other
secondary legislative materials, which led to confusion regarding the statute’s
scope.22 Indeed, “[t]he issue of discrimination against women in athletics
programs of schools was mentioned only briefly during the congressional
debates leading up to Title IX’s enactment.”23 In light of the uncertainty over
16. Neal v. Bd. of Trs., 198 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1999).
17. Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 87 (D.D.C. 2003)
(quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5804 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh)) (citing Education
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–318, §§ 901–05, 86 Stat. 373, 373-75 (1972)).
18. Id. (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)).
19. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2016). The provision “is
patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.” Nat’l Wrestling Coaches
Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 87 (citing Education Amendments § 901; N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456
U.S. 512, 514, 529 (1982); 118 Cong. Rec. 5802, 5803, 5807 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of
Sen. Bayh)).
20. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993).
21. Id. at 893.
22. Id.; Glatt, supra note 12, at 300.
23. McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 286 (2d Cir. 2004);
see also Cohen, 991 F.2d at 893 (noting “there were apparently only two mentions of intercollegiate
athletics during the congressional debate”).
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whether athletics fell within the scope of Title IX, “for the first few years after
it was passed, no court applied Title IX to find discrimination in an
educational athletic setting.”24
B.

The 1975 Regulations

In 1974, Congress made it clear that Title IX encompassed athletics when
it enacted section 844 of the Education Amendments of 1974 (known as the
Javits Amendment), which provided that
The Secretary of . . . H[ealth,] E[ducation, and] W[elfare] shall
prepare and publish . . . proposed regulations
implementing the provisions of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 relating to the prohibition of sex
discrimination in federally assisted education programs which
shall include with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities
reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular
sports.25
“On June 20, 1974, [the Department of] H[ealth,] E[ducation, and]
W[elfare] (HEW) published its proposed regulations implementing Title IX,”
which included provisions specifically “address[ing] [Title IX]’s application to
athletic programs.”26 HEW followed the requisite notice and comment
procedures and, “[a]fter considering over 9,700 comments, suggestions, and
objections . . . published [its] final regulations implementing Title IX on June 4,
1975.”27 President Ford signed the regulations on May 27, 1975, after which
they were submitted to Congress for review pursuant to the General Education
Provisions Act (GEPA).28 Congress subsequently held six days of hearings on
the regulation and did not disapprove them within the forty-five days allowed

24. Glatt, supra note 12, at 300–01.
25. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, A POLICY INTERPRETATION: TITLE IX AND INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS (1979) [hereinafter POLICY INTERPRETATION] (alteration in original) (emphasis added);
see also Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 95 (4th Cir. 2011); McCormick, 370
F.3d at 287; Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1994); Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v.
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 88 (D.D.C. 2003); Glatt, supra note 12, at 301.
26. Equity in Athletics, Inc., 639 F.3d at 95 (citing 39 Fed. Reg. 22,227, 22,236 (June 20, 1974));
see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287.
27. Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 664 (W.D. Va. 2009); see also
Equity in Athletics, 639 F.3d at 95; McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287.
28. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25.
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under GEPA; accordingly, the regulations became effective on July 21, 1975.29
The regulation applying Title IX to the athletic programs of educational
institutions receiving federal funding remains effective today and “is the only
regulation that discusses the application of Title IX to athletics.”30 It states as
follows:
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated
differently from another person or otherwise be discriminated
against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or
intramural athletics offered by a recipient, and no recipient
shall provide any such athletics separately on such basis.31
While this language appears to mandate co-ed teams, the regulation also
recognizes that schools may offer separate teams for each gender as long as
“either the sport in which the team competes is a contact sport or the
institution offers comparable teams in the sport to both genders.”32 However,
regardless of whether or not a school offers gender-segregated teams, “[a]
recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or
intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both
sexes.”33 The regulation goes on to provide a non-exhaustive list of ten factors
relevant to the determination of whether a school is providing equal athletic
opportunities to members of both sexes:
In determining whether equal opportunities are available the
Director will consider, among other factors:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of
competition effectively accommodate the interests and
abilities of members of both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic

29. Id.; McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287; Equity in Athletics, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 664.
30. Glatt, supra note 12, at 302; see also Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 88.
31. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2016).
32. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 896 (1st Cir. 1993); see also § 106.41(b).
33. § 106.41(c).
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tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive
facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and
services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(10) Publicity.34
Title IX claims based on the failure of an institution to provide equal
athletic opportunities to members of both sexes fall into two categories based
on the factors listed in the regulation. “Effective accommodation” claims
derive from the first factor and concern “a school’s allocation of athletic
participation opportunities to its female and male students.”35 “Equal
treatment” claims, on the other hand, focus on the remaining factors, which have
been interpreted to require “equivalence in the availability, quality and kinds of
other athletic benefits and opportunities provided male and female athletes,”36
and typically “allege sex-based differences in the schedules, equipment,
coaching, and other factors affecting participants in athletics.”37 Regardless of
whether a school provides equal athletic benefits to both sexes in the sports
offered, the school may still be in violation of Title IX based
solely on its failure to effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of
student-athletes of both sexes under the first factor.38
Courts have accorded the 1975 Regulations substantial deference. Where
Congress entrusted the administration of a statute to an executive agency and
explicitly left a gap in the statute for the agency to fill, the United States
Supreme Court has deemed this to be “an express delegation of authority to the
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”39
“Such . . . regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,

34. Id.; see also Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 2012).
35. McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 291 (2d Cir. 2004);
see also Biediger, 691 F.3d at 92.
36. Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
37. Id. at 965; see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 291. Most appellate decisions in the Title IX context
involve effective accommodation claims, as opposed to equal treatment claims. Id.
38. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 965; Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1994); Glatt,
supra note 12, at 302.
39. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
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capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”40 Courts have consistently
found that Congress explicitly delegated to HEW (and, ultimately, DOE) the
task of issuing “regulations containing ‘reasonable provisions considering the
nature of particular sports’” “with respect to ‘intercollegiate athletic activities’”
under Title IX.41 Moreover, the ensuing regulations were held to be “neither
‘arbitrary . . . [n]or manifestly contrary to the statute.’”42 Therefore, the 1975
Regulations have received “considerable deference.”43
C.

The 1979 Policy Interpretation

Unfortunately, while the 1975 Regulations clarified whether Title IX
applied to athletics, they “did little to clarify [many of the] issues arising from
that application.”44 Over the next three years, HEW “received nearly 100
complaints alleging discrimination in athletics against more than 50
institutions of higher education.”45 In the course of investigating these
complaints and attempting to answer questions from educational institutions,
HEW decided it needed to further explain the regulations “so as to provide a
framework within which the complaints can be resolved, and to provide
institutions of higher education with additional guidance on the requirements
for compliance with Title IX in intercollegiate athletic programs.”46
40. Id. at 844. Indeed, the Supreme Court “ha[s] long recognized that considerable weight should
be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations.” Id. (citation omitted).
41. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 270 (quoting Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat.
484, 612 (1974)); see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 288; Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st
Cir. 1993); Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 675 (W.D. Va. 2009).
42. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 270 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467
U.S. at 844).
43. Id.; Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 96 (D.D.C.
2003); see also Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895 (“The degree of deference is particularly high in Title IX cases
because Congress explicitly delegated to the agency the task of prescribing standards for athletic
programs under Title IX.”); Glatt, supra note 12, at 312 (stating that the regulations “are awarded
substantial deference under Chevron”); cf. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 92 (D.
Conn. 2010) (finding the 1975 Regulations “a reasonable interpretation of Title IX promulgated by
HEW (and, today, enforced by OCR) according to specific congressional delegation,” mandating
“‘particularly high deference’ under . . . Chevron.”).
44. Glatt, supra note 12, at 302.
45. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25; see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 290 (quoting POLICY
INTERPRETATION, supra note 25); Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271 n.7; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 896; Glatt, supra note
12, at 302.
46. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25; see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 290 (Policy
Interpretation was proposed “to provide additional guidance to schools on the requirements of Title IX
compliance”); Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271 n.7 (Policy Interpretation was promulgated to enable schools “to
establish whether they were in compliance with Title IX”); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 896 (Policy
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To that end, on December 11, 1978, HEW published a proposed Policy
Interpretation of the intercollegiate athletic provisions of Title IX for public
comment.47 In the months that followed, HEW received “[o]ver 700
comments reflecting a broad range of opinion.”48 Agency staff also “visited
eight universities in June and July, 1979, to see how the proposed policy and
other suggested alternatives would apply in actual practice at individual
campuses.”49 “The final Policy Interpretation[, published on December 11,
1979,] reflects the many comments HEW received and the results of the
individual campus visits.”50
The Policy Interpretation “applies to any public or private
institution . . . that operates an educational program or activity which receives
or benefits from [federal] financial assistance,” including “educational
institutions whose students participate in [federally] funded or guaranteed
student loan or assistance programs.”51 Its stated goals are: (1) to “clarif[y] the
meaning of ‘equal opportunity’ in intercollegiate athletics,” as set forth in the
1975 Regulations; (2) to “explain[] the factors and standards set out in the law
and regulation” which will be considered in determining whether an
institution’s intercollegiate athletics program is in compliance with the equal
opportunity requirements of the regulations; and (3) to “provide[] guidance to
assist institutions in determining whether any disparities which may exist
between men’s and women’s programs are justifiable and nondiscriminatory.”52
The Policy Interpretation sets forth the requirements necessary to achieve
compliance within three major areas of Title IX: (1) athletic financial assistance
(i.e., scholarships); (2) equivalence in other athletic benefits and opportunities
(the factors laid out in 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(2)–(10)); and (3) effective
accommodation of student interests and abilities (the factor laid out in 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.41(c)(1)).53 A university is in violation of Title IX if it violates any one
of these three major areas of investigation.54
Interpretation was implemented to “encourage self-policing and thereby winnow complaints”).
47. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25; see also Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ.,
675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 664 (W.D. Va. 2009).
48. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25.
49. Id.; see also Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 664–65.
50. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25; see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 290.
51. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25.
52. Id.; see also Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 665; Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v.
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 89 (D.D.C. 2003).
53. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993); Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263
F. Supp. 2d at 89 n.3; POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25.
54. Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 89 n.3. Thus, a school may be in violation
of Title IX if it ineffectively accommodates students’ interests and abilities, even if it meets the athletic

HEFFERAN ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE)

592

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

6/14/2016 5:34 PM

[Vol. 26:2

As to the effective accommodation of student interests and abilities, “the
governing principle in this area is that the athletic interests and abilities of male
and female students must be equally effectively accommodated.”55 In assessing
compliance with this area, the agency examines three factors:
a. The determination of athletic interests and abilities of
students;
b. The selection of sports offered; and
c. The levels of competition available including the
opportunity for team competition.56
Under the third factor—levels of competition—the Policy Interpretation
states that “[i]n effectively accommodating the interests and abilities of male
and female athletes, institutions must provide both the opportunity for
individuals of each sex to participate in intercollegiate competition, and for
athletes of each sex to have competitive team schedules which equally reflect
their abilities.”57 Thus, compliance under this third factor is measured by
reference to two separate benchmarks: “(1) equity in athletic opportunities; and
(2) equity in competition.”58 Whether a university meets these obligations is
determined under two distinct tests, both of which must be satisfied to
comply with this component of Title IX’s mandate.59
As to whether a university is providing equal opportunity for individuals of
each sex to participate in intercollegiate competition, compliance is
assessed in any of the following ways:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for
financial assistance and equivalence in other athletics benefits and opportunities prongs. See Cohen,
991 F.2d at 897. “In other words, an institution that offers women a smaller number of athletic
opportunities than the statute requires may not rectify that violation simply by lavishing more resources
on those women or achieving equivalence in other respects.” Id.
55. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25; see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 291.
56. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25; see also Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d
824, 828 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25); Nat’l Wrestling Coaches
Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 90 (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25).
57. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25 (emphasis added); see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at
300 (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d
414, 437 (D. Conn. 2013) (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25); Nat’l Wrestling Coaches
Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25).
58. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 437.
59. Id.
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male and female students are provided in numbers
substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the
institution can show a history and continuing practice of
program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the
developing interest and abilities of the members of that sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among
intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a
continuing practice of program expansion such as that cited
above, whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and
abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and
effectively accommodated by the present program.60
This is the famous (or infamous) “three-part test,” the application of which
forms the crux of most Title IX litigation.61 “The test is applied to assess
whether an institution is providing nondiscriminatory participation
opportunities to individuals of both sexes . . . .”62 The three prongs of the test
establish “safe harbors,” and a university is in compliance with Title IX as long
as it meets any one of the three prongs.63
As to the second benchmark—equity in competition—the Policy
Interpretation sets forth a two-part “levels of competition” test.64 Compliance
is assessed by examining the following:
(1) Whether the competitive schedules for men’s and
women’s teams, on a program-wide basis, afford

60. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25; see also Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85,
92–93 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25); Equity in Athletics, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 96 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25);
Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting POLICY
INTERPRETATION, supra note 25); McCormick, 370 F.3d at 300 (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION,
supra note 25); Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828-29 (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25); Cohen
v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25);
Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note
25).
61. McCormick, 370 F.3d at 300.
62. Id.
63. Id.; Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 965; Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 88 (D.
Conn. 2010).
64. See Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 437.
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proportionally similar numbers of male and female athletes
equivalently advanced competitive opportunities; or
(2) Whether the institution can demonstrate a history and
continuing practice of upgrading the competitive opportunities
available to the historically disadvantaged sex as warranted by
developing abilities among the athletes of that sex.65
Informal agency rulings such as the Policy Interpretation, which are not
arrived at after a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, are
not entitled to Chevron-level deference.66 Still, as the Supreme Court
acknowledged in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,67 such rulings “are made in
pursuance of official duty, based upon more specialized experience and
broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a
particular case,” and are therefore “entitled to respect.”68 “[These] rulings,
interpretations and opinions . . . while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”69
Unlike the more lenient standard in Chevron, whether such pronouncements
receive deference in a given case “will depend upon the thoroughness evident
in [their] consideration, the validity of [their] reasoning, [their] consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give [them] power
to persuade, if lacking power to control.”70
However, some informal agency pronouncements lacking the force of law
are still entitled to “substantial deference.”71 “Because applying an agency’s
regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the agency’s
unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives,” courts will “presume that the
power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the
agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”72 Accordingly, if the informal agency
pronouncement is an interpretation of the agency’s own regulation, and the
65. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25; see also Roberts, 998 F.2d at 829 (quoting POLICY
INTERPRETATION, supra note 25); Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 439 (quoting POLICY INTERPRETATION,
supra note 25).
66. Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); see also Glatt, supra note 12, at 312–13.
67. See generally 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
68. Id. at 139–40.
69. Id. at 140.
70. Id.; see also Christensen, 529 U.S. at 586–87; Glatt, supra note 12, at 313.
71. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 150 (1991) (quoting
Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986)).
72. Id. at 151.
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language of the regulation is ambiguous, courts will give effect to the agency’s
interpretation as long as it is “reasonable” and “sensibly conforms to the purpose
and wording of the regulations.”73 Courts will, therefore, defer to the agency’s
interpretation “unless that interpretation is ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation[s] or there is any other reason to suspect that the
interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the
matter in question.’”74
The Policy Interpretation, though an informal agency pronouncement, is
accorded the substantial level of deference discussed above. Courts have
determined that “the regulatory language that the policy interpretation
construes describes how an institution can provide ‘equal athletic opportunity
for members of both sexes’ and ‘effectively accommodate the interests and
abilities of members of both sexes.’”75 The applicable language from the 1975
Regulations has been found to have been “written at a high level of abstraction
and, as a result, is ambiguous,” as evidenced by “the high number of suits that
arose immediately after the promulgation of the regulation[s].”76 Accordingly,
the Policy Interpretation has been deemed “a reasonable and ‘considered
interpretation of the regulation[s],’” which is entitled to “controlling
deference.”77 Indeed, “every court that has confronted the issue has held that
the 1979 Policy Interpretation constitutes a reasonable and considered
interpretation of § [106].41, and thus, that it is entitled to deference.”78
73. Id. at 150–51 (quoting N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter Cty. Chapter of Izaak Walton League of
Am., Inc., 423 U.S. 12, 15 (1975)); Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588; see also Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., Univ.
of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 1994).
74. Mullins v. City of New York, 653 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting
Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2261 (2011)); see also Chalenor v. Univ. of
N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1046 (8th Cir. 2002) (deferring to any reasonable construction by the agency,
“even though its interpretation might ‘not be the best or most natural one by grammatical or other
standards.’”) (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991)); Equity in
Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 675 (W.D. Va. 2009).
75. Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1046–47 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2000)).
76. Id. at 1047.
77. Id. (citation omitted).
78. Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 675; see also, e.g., Mansourian v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 965 n.9 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Policy Interpretation is entitled
to deference under Chevron and Martin); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828 (10th
Cir. 1993) (deferring “substantially” to the Policy Interpretation as an “effectively legislative” agency
interpretation of its own regulations, “pursuant to a statutory delegation”); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991
F.2d 888, 896–97 (1st Cir. 1993) (according the Policy Interpretation “substantial deference” as a
“considered interpretation of the regulation”); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414, 440
(D. Conn. 2013) (“The Second Circuit has held that courts owe the 1979 Policy Interpretation . . . a
high degree of deference.”); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 92 (D. Conn. 2010)
(finding the Policy Interpretation subject to deference under either Chevron or Skidmore because “it is
both persuasive and not unreasonable”) (citation omitted); Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t
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Shortly after publication of the Policy Interpretation in 1979, Congress
enacted the Department of Education Organization Act of 1979, which divided
HEW into two new agencies—the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) and DOE.79 The existing Title IX regulations promulgated by HEW
were left with HHS, and DOE duplicated and re-codified them.80 However, all
of HEW’s educational functions were transferred to DOE, and DOE became the
principal locus of Title IX enforcement activity, treating the 1975 HEW
Regulations as its own.81 Accordingly, courts have “treat[ed] DOE as the
[administrative] agency charged with administering Title IX.”82
D.

Developments in the 1980s

The regulatory regime contemplated by the 1975 Regulations and the
Policy Interpretation hit a roadblock in 1984, when the United States Supreme
Court held in Grove City College v. Bell83 that Title IX was
“program-specific.”84 This meant that “only the particular program that
received federal financial assistance could be regulated under Title IX, as
opposed to the entire institution.”85 As the First Circuit observed, “[b]ecause
few athletic departments are direct recipients of federal funds—most federal
money for universities is channeled through financial aid offices or invested
directly in research grants—Grove City cabined Title IX and placed virtually all
collegiate athletic programs beyond its reach.”86
of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 96 (D.D.C. 2003) (according “considerable deference” to the Policy
Interpretation “based on findings that it does not violate the statute or regulations, exceed the agency’s
statutory authority, or offend constitutional principles of Equal Protection”); cf. Biediger v. Quinnipiac
Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 96–97 (2d Cir. 2012) (erroneously citing McCormick for the proposition that the
Policy Interpretation is entitled to “high deference” under Chevron, when McCormick refrained from
determining which level of deference to apply to the Policy Interpretation).
79. Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 91; see also Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t
of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 96 (4th Cir. 2011); McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck,
370 F.3d 275, 287 (2d Cir. 2004); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895.
80. McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895; Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F.
Supp. 2d at 91–92.
81. Equity in Athletics, Inc., 639 F.3d at 96; McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287, 290; Cohen, 991 F.2d at
895; Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 676.
82. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 96 n.4; see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287 (quoting Biediger, 691 F.3d
at 96 n.4); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895.
83. See generally 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
84. McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894; Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d
at 665.
85. Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 665; see also McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287; Cohen,
991 F.2d at 894.
86. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894.
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In response to Grove City, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987.87 The Civil Rights Restoration Act reinstated the institution-wide
application of Title IX and requires that if any part of an educational
institution receives federal funds, then the institution as a whole must comply
with Title IX.88 While the Civil Rights Restoration Act does not specifically
reference athletics, “the record of the floor debate leaves little doubt that the
enactment was aimed, in part, at creating a more level playing field for female
athletes.”89 As a result, courts consider it “crystal clear that Title IX applies to
athletic programs operated by any school receiving federal funding for any of
its educational programs and activities, and not just to those athletic programs
which directly receive[] federal dollars.”90
E.

Letters of Clarification

Since the 1980s, OCR, the sub-agency of DOE tasked with enforcing Title
IX, has issued several letters of clarification relating to the three-prong test, as
well as a letter addressing which activities constitute a sport for Title IX
purposes.91
1.The 1996 Clarification
Recognizing “the need to provide additional clarification regarding what is
commonly referred to as the ‘three-part test,’ [and] to respond to requests for
specific guidance about the existing standards that have guided the
enforcement of Title IX in the area of intercollegiate athletics,” on September
20, 1995, OCR circulated a draft of a proposed policy clarification to over 4,500
interested parties, “soliciting comments about whether the document provided
sufficient clarity to assist institutions in their efforts to comply with Title IX.”92

87. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2016).
88. McCormick, 370 F.3d at 287; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894; Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d
at 666.
89. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894.
90. Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 666 (quoting Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 94 (D.D.C. 2003)).
91. Rachel Schwarz, Note, Timeout! Getting Back to What Title IX Intended and Encouraging
Courts and the Office of Civil Rights to Re-Evaluate the Three-Prong Compliance Test, 20 WASH. &
LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 633, 646 (2014); see also Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d
414, 440 (D. Conn. 2013).
92. Norma V. Cantú, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter, OFF. FOR CIV.
RTS., U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Jan. 16, 1996), http://www2.ed.gov/print/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.html; see also Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 666; Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263
F. Supp. 2d at 92.
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DOE also published a notice in the Federal Register announcing the availability
of the draft clarification.93 After receiving comments from over 200 individuals
as to whether the proposed clarification provided the appropriate level of clarity,
on January 16, 1996, DOE released the final version of the policy clarification.94
The final version of the policy clarification “provides specific factors that
guide an analysis of each part of the three-part test . . . [and] provides examples
to demonstrate, in concrete terms, how these factors will be considered.”95 In
particular, the 1996 Clarification emphasizes that
[T]he three-part test furnishes an institution with three
individual avenues to choose from when determining how it
will provide individuals of each sex with nondiscriminatory
opportunities to participate in intercollegiate athletics. If an
institution has met any part of the three-part test, OCR will
determine that the institution is meeting this requirement.96
As to the first prong of the three-part test—substantial
proportionality—the 1996 Clarification states that “where an institution
provides intercollegiate level athletic participation opportunities for male and
female students in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective
full-time undergraduate enrollments, OCR will find that the institution is
providing nondiscriminatory participation opportunities for individuals of both
sexes.”97 The first step in this analysis entails “a determination of the number
of participation opportunities afforded to male and female athletes in the
intercollegiate athletic program.”98 This, in turn, begs the question of who
exactly may be counted as a “participant” for purposes of this analysis.
93. Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 666.
94. Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 92; see also Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F.
Supp. 2d at 666; Cantú, supra note 92.
95. Cantú, supra note 92; see also Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 666; Nat’l Wrestling
Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 92–93 (quoting Cantú, supra note 92).
96. Cantú, supra note 92 (noting “that an institution can choose which part of the test it plans to
meet,” and it “need . . . comply only with any one part of the three-part test in order to provide
nondiscriminatory participation opportunities for individuals of both sexes.”); see also Equity in
Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 97 (4th Cir. 2011); Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp.
2d at 666; Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 93 (quoting Cantú, supra note 92).
97. Cantú, supra note 92 (noting that the substantial proportionality prong “focuses on the
participation rates of men and women at an institution and affords an institution a ‘safe harbor’ for
establishing that it provides nondiscriminatory participation opportunities.”).
98. Id. (emphasizing that the clarification “further clarifies how Title IX requires OCR to count
participation opportunities”); see also Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2012);
Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 88 (D. Conn. 2010).
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The Policy Interpretation defines participants as those athletes:
a. Who are receiving the institutionally-sponsored support
normally provided to athletes competing at the institution
involved, e.g., coaching, equipment, medical and training room
services, on a regular basis during a sport’s season; and
b. Who are participating in organized practice sessions and
other team meetings and activities on a regular basis during a
sport’s season; and
c. Who are listed on the eligibility or squad lists maintained for
each sport; or
d. Who, because of injury, cannot meet a, b, or c above but
continue to receive financial aid on the basis of athletic
ability.99
The 1996 Clarification reiterates that the definition of “participant” is quite
broad indeed. A “participant” does not need “to meet minimum criteria of
playing time or athletic ability.”100 The definition includes not only
scholarship athletes receiving playing time, but “those athletes who do not
receive scholarships (e.g., walk-ons), those athletes who compete on teams
sponsored by the institution even though the team may be required to raise some
or all of its operating funds, and those athletes who practice but may not
compete.”101 In general, “all athletes who are listed on a team’s squad or
eligibility list and are on the team as of the team’s first competitive event are
counted as participants by OCR.”102 Student-athletes who participate in more
than one sport may be counted as a participant in each sport in which they
participate.103
Notwithstanding this broad definition of “participant,”
99. Cantú, supra note 92 (quoting language from the Policy Interpretation as the “definition of
participant to determine the number of participation opportunities provided by an institution for
purposes of the three-part test.”).
100. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 93; see also Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 88 (quoting Biediger, 691 F.3d
at 93); Cantú, supra note 92.
101. Cantú, supra note 92; see also Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89 (quoting Cantú, supra note 92).
This is because OCR determined “that these athletes receive numerous benefits and services, such as
training and practice time, coaching, tutoring services, locker room facilities, and equipment, as well
as important non-tangible benefits derived from being a member of an intercollegiate athletic team.”
Cantú, supra note 92.
102. Cantú, supra note 92; accord Biediger, 691 F.3d at 93.
103. Cantú, supra note 92; see also Biediger, 691 F.3d at 93; Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 966 (9th Cir. 2010).
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however, OCR cautions that only “actual” athletes may be counted, “because
participation opportunities must be real, not illusory.”104 This means that the
student-athlete must be “offer[ed] the same benefits as would be provided to
other bona fide athletes.”105
Unfortunately, while OCR devoted much of its attention in the 1996
Clarification to which student-athletes may be counted as participants under the
substantial proportionality prong, it neglected to devote the same coverage to
the related issue of which activities qualify as participation opportunities. The
only insight on this topic offered in the 1996 Clarification is the brief statement
that “the requirement to provide nondiscriminatory participation
opportunities is only one of many factors that OCR examines to determine if an
institution is in compliance with the athletics provision of Title IX.” 106 “OCR
also considers the quality of competition offered to members of both sexes in
order to determine whether an institution effectively accommodates the interests
and abilities of its students.”107
Once all male and female participants are counted, the second step in the
analysis is to determine whether athletic opportunities at the institution are
substantially proportionate to the percentages of male and female
undergraduate enrollment at the institution.108 The 1996 Clarification makes
clear that substantial proportionality does not mean exact proportionality.109
“Because this determination depends on the institution’s specific
circumstances and the size of its athletic program, OCR makes this
determination on a case-by-case basis, rather than . . . us[ing] . . . a statistical
test.”110 OCR further clarified that it would
consider

[participation]

opportunities . . . substantially

104. Cantú, supra note 92; see also Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 965–66 (defining participants as “the
number of . . . athletes who actually participate in varsity athletics”); Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v.
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 93 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing 1996 Clarification as “making it
clear that the number of actual athletes on a team, as opposed to the number of slots available on a team,
is used”).
105. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 93; Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89.
106. Cantú, supra note 92.
107. Id. (emphasis added); see also Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 93.
108. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 94; Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414, 440 (D. Conn.
2013); Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89; Cantú, supra note 92.
109. Cantú, supra note 92; see also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993)
(holding “that, while Title IX prohibits discrimination, it does not mandate strict numerical equality
between the gender balance of a college’s athletic program and the gender balance of its student body.”).
110. Cantú, supra note 92; see also Biediger, 691 F.3d at 94; Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 440;
Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89.
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proportionate when the number of opportunities that would be
required to achieve proportionality would not be sufficient to
sustain a viable team, i.e., a team for which there is a sufficient
number of interested and able students and enough available
competition to sustain an intercollegiate team.111
Consistent with the 1996 Clarification statement that exact
proportionality is not required, no case to date has found “a disparity of two
percentage points or less . . . to manifest a lack of substantial
proportionality.”112
OCR also used its explanation of substantial proportionality in the 1996
Clarification to respond to critics who claimed that Title IX established an
impermissible quota system. The statute itself states that Title IX shall not
be interpreted to require any educational institution to grant
preferential or disparate treatment to the members of one sex
on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the
total number or percentage of persons of that sex
participating in or receiving the benefits of any federally
supported program or activity, in comparison with the total
number or percentage of persons of that sex in any
community, State, section, or other area.113
In essence, this means that “a court assessing Title IX compliance may not
find a violation solely because there is a disparity between the gender
composition of an educational institution’s student constituency, on the one
hand, and its athletic programs, on the other hand.”114 This does not, however,
preclude consideration of such statistical disparities.115 Pursuant to a proviso
also found in Title IX, “a Title IX plaintiff in an athletic discrimination suit must
accompany statistical evidence of disparate impact with some further
111. Cantú, supra note 92; see also Biediger, 691 F.3d at 94; Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 440;
Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89. “So, for example, if a school has five fewer female athletes than needed
to reach exact proportionality, OCR would find the athletic program to be substantially proportional
because no varsity team can be sustained with so few participants.” Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89.
112. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 106; see also Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 111.
113. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2016); see also Cohen,
991 F.2d at 894 (quoting § 1681(b)); Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F.
Supp. 2d 82, 87 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting § 1681(b)).
114. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895.
115. Id.; Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
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evidence of discrimination, such as unmet need amongst the members of the
disadvantaged gender.”116
OCR further elaborated on these principles in the Cantú Letter
accompanying the 1996 Clarification. The Cantú Letter reiterated that
“underrepresentation alone is not the measure of discrimination [and]
[s]ubstantial proportionality merely provides institutions with a safe harbor.”117
Thus, “OCR does not require quotas.”118 Substantial proportionality is only one
of three alternative measures, meaning that “[a]n institution that does not
provide substantially proportional participation opportunities for men and
women may comply with Title IX by satisfying either part two or part three of
the test.”119
Finally, recognizing that “institutions face challenges in providing
nondiscriminatory participation opportunities for their students,” OCR
emphasized that “[t]he three-part test gives institutions flexibility and control
over their athletics programs.”120 Such flexibility is indicative of “a society that
cherishes academic freedom” and a judicial system that “recognizes that
universities deserve great leeway in their operations.”121
116. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895; see also Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 87–88
(quoting § 1681); cf. Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 268, 270 (7th Cir. 1994) (“In
essence the policy interpretation establishes a presumption that ‘effective accommodation’ has been
achieved if males and females at a school participate in intercollegiate sports in numbers
substantially proportionate to the number of students of each sex enrolled at the institution . . . . [I]f the
percentage of student-athletes of a particular sex is substantially proportionate to the percentage of
students of that sex in the general student population, the athletic interests of that sex are presumed to
have been accommodated.”).
117. Cantú, supra note 92.
118. Id.
119. Id. “For example, if an institution chooses to and does comply with part three of the test, OCR
will not require it to provide substantially proportionate participation opportunities to, or demonstrate
a history and continuing practice of program expansion that is responsive to the developing interests
of, the underrepresented sex.” Id.
120. Id. (“Ultimately, Title IX provides institutions with flexibility and choice regarding how they
will provide nondiscriminatory participation opportunities.”); see also Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ.,
691 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2012); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 89 (D. Conn. 2010).
121. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 906. Judicial reticence to interfere in the operations of higher education
likely also explains the tendency of courts, even when finding a Title IX violation, to require the
university in question to propose a compliance plan in the first instance rather than simply mandating
the creation or deletion of particular teams. Id. Congress itself has expressed a preference for voluntary
compliance with Title IX. Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 88 n.2 (citing Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2016)). Consistent with such preference, the
“DoE ‘has not terminated its funding for any postsecondary institution for violation of [T]itle IX,’ but
rather has secured compliance through ‘complaint investigations, compliance reviews, and the issuance
of policy guidance.’ . . . The agency’s ‘approach to enforcement emphasizes collaboration and
negotiation.’” Id. (quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GENDER EQUITY: MEN’S AND
WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 5 (2000)) (internal citation omitted).
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[S]trict numerical formulas or ‘cookie cutter’ answers to the
issues that are inherently case- and fact-specific . . . not only
would belie the meaning of Title IX, but would at the same time
deprive institutions of the flexibility to which they are entitled
when deciding how best to comply with the law.122
Accordingly, rather than “pour[ing] ever-increasing sums into its athletic
establishment,” an institution may also comply with the substantial
proportionality prong “by subtraction and downgrading, that is, by reducing
opportunities for the overrepresented gender while keeping opportunities
stable for the underrepresented gender (or reducing them to a much lesser
extent).”123 Schools, therefore, “can choose to eliminate or cap teams as a way
of complying with part one of the three-part test.”124 At the same time,
however, “nothing in the three-part test requires an institution to eliminate
participation opportunities for men.”125
Finally, courts accord the 1996 Clarification “substantial deference,”

Although the district court has the power to order specific relief if the institution
wishes to continue receiving federal funds . . . the many routes to Title IX compliance
make specific relief most useful in situations where the institution, after a judicial
determination of noncompliance, demonstrates an unwillingness or inability to
exercise its discretion in a way that brings it into compliance with Title IX.
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 906–07 (internal citation omitted); see also Glatt, supra note 12, at 302
(“Although the OCR has the authority to revoke federal funding from violating schools, it has never
taken such action. Rather, the OCR usually works with universities to help ensure compliance.”)
(citation omitted) (citing Greg Garber, Three-Pronged Test Makes True Compliance Vague, ESPN,
http://espn.go.com/gen/womenandsports/020619enforce.html (last updated June 19, 2012)).
122. Cantú, supra note 92.
123. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898 n.15.
124. Cantú, supra note 92; see also Biediger, 691 F.3d at 94; Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89; cf.
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 905.
In an era where the practices of higher education must adjust to stunted revenues,
careening costs, and changing demographics, colleges might well be obliged to curb
spending on programs, like athletics, that do not lie at the epicenter of their
institutional mission. Title IX does not purport to override financial necessity.
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 905. Indeed, “Title IX does not require institutions to fund any particular number
or type of athletic opportunities—only that they provide those opportunities in a nondiscriminatory
fashion if they wish to receive federal funds.” Id. at 906.
125. Cantú, supra note 92.
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because it “reflect[s] reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguities in its own
regulation, and there is no reason to think that the agency’s interpretations do
not reflect its ‘fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.’”126
2. The April 11, 2000 Letter
Although the 1996 Clarification provided great detail about which
student-athletes count as “participants” for purposes of the substantial
proportionality prong, neither it nor any of the agency promulgations that
preceded it provided much guidance as to which athletic activities count
toward determining the male and female participation opportunities at a given
institution.127 In other words, what exactly constitutes a “sport” for purposes of
Title IX? Even after the 1996 Clarification, “no procedure or formula
existed for a university to determine which sports teams counted toward the
‘substantial proportionality’ requirement.”128 In 2000, OCR issued a letter in
response to a request by the Minnesota State High School League that
discussed “the agency’s standards for distinguishing [a] ‘sport[]’ from [an]
‘extracurricular activit[y]’ for purposes of Title IX [compliance].”129
In this April 11, 2000 Letter, OCR recognized, “As part of its
responsibility for enforcing the Title IX provisions regarding athletic
programs, [it] must determine” which activities are part of an institution’s
athletic program.130 However, “OCR does not rely on a specific definition of a
sport.”131 Rather, OCR makes a case-by-case determination based, in part,
126. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 97 (quoting Mullins v. City of New York, 653 F.3d 104, 113–14 (2d
Cir.2011)); see also Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 965 n.9 (9th Cir. 2010)
(noting that the Ninth Circuit and other circuits have held that the 1996 Clarification is entitled to
deference under Chevron and Martin); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414, 445 (D.
Conn. 2013) (stating the 1996 Clarification is entitled to “substantial deference”); Biediger, 728 F.
Supp. 2d at 92 (observing that circuit courts have deemed the 1996 Clarification is “deserving of
deference”).
127. See Glatt, supra note 12, at 304 (finding that “the 1979 Policy Interpretation largely ignored
the meaning of the word ‘athletic.’”).
128. Id.
129. Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea, Nat’l Coordinator for Title IX Athletics, Office for Civil
Rights, to David V. Stead, Exec. Dir., Minn. State High Sch. League (Apr. 11, 2000) (on file with the
United States Department of Education); see also Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 444; Biediger, 728 F.
Supp. 2d at 91.
130. Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to David V. Stead, supra note 129.
131. Id. While OCR does not rely on a specific definition of “sport,” other jurisdictions have
undertaken such an endeavor. For instance, the California Education Code defines “extracurricular
activity”
as a program that has all of the following characteristics:
(A) The program is supervised or financed by the school district.
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on the purpose of the activity, the specification of seasons and competitions, and
the adoption of official rules and personnel requirements.132 The determination
of what constitutes a sport for purposes of Title IX would also take into
consideration factors identified by athletic organizations or associations to
differentiate between support activity and a sport.133
OCR then enumerated the types of inquiries it would make and the process
it would follow in assessing whether an activity constitutes a sport.134
In determining whether an activity is a sport OCR will
consider . . .




whether selection for the team is based upon objective
factors related primarily to athletic ability;
...
whether the team prepares for and engages in
competition in the same way as other teams in the
athletic program with respect to coaching,
recruitment, budget, try outs and eligibility, and length
and
number
of
practice
sessions
and
competitive opportunities;

(B) Pupils participating in the program represent the school district.
(C) Pupils exercise some degree of freedom in either the selection, planning, or
control of the program.
(D) The program includes both preparation for performance and performance
before an audience or spectators.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35160.5(a)(1) (2016). The California Education Code further defines
“[i]nterscholastic athletics . . . as ‘those policies, programs, and activities that are formulated or
executed in conjunction with, or in contemplation of, athletic contests between two or more schools,
either public or private.’” Id. § 35179(f).
132. Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to David V. Stead, supra note 129. OCR made clear
that it does not “rely solely on a claim by the institution that the activity is part of the athletic program.”
Id.
133. Id. OCR’s definition of “sport” is similar to the NCAA’s definition, which states “[A] sport
shall be defined as an institutional activity involving physical exertion with the purpose of
competition . . . within a defined competitive season(s) . . . and standardized rules with rating/scoring
systems ratified by official regulatory agencies and governing bodies.” CRITERIA FOR EMERGING
SPORTS,
NCAA.ORG,
(n.d.),
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Criteria+for+Emerging+Sports.pdf.
134. Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to David V. Stead, supra note 129.
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whether the activity is administered by the athletic department; and
...
whether
state,
national,
and
conference
championships exist for the activity135

If, after analysis of these factors, it is evident that the purpose of the team is
primarily to support and promote other athletes, then the team will not be
considered to be engaged in a sport.136
OCR further provided that it would also consider the following
non-exhaustive list of “other evidence relevant to the activity, which might
demonstrate that it is part of an institution’s athletic program”:











135. Id.
136. See id.

“whether the activity is recognized as part of the
interscholastic or intercollegiate athletic program by
the athletic conference to which the institution
belongs and by organized state and national
interscholastic or intercollegiate athletic associations;”
whether organizations knowledgeable about the
activity agree that it should be recognized as an
athletic sport;
whether there is a specified season for the activity
which has a recognized commencement and ends in a
championship;
whether there are specified regulations for the activity
governing the activity such as coaching, recruitment,
eligibility, and the length and number of practice
sessions and competitive opportunities;
“whether a state, national, or conference rule book or
manual has been adopted for the activity;”
“whether there is state, national, or conference
regulation of competition officials along with
standardized criteria upon which the competition may
be judged; and,
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whether participants in the activity/sport are eligible to
receive scholarships and athletics awards (e.g.,
varsity awards).”137

3. The September 17, 2008 Letter
Following the April 11, 2000 Letter, it would be another eight years before
OCR issued a further pronouncement regarding what constitutes a “sport” for
purposes of Title IX.138 “In September 2008, Stephanie Monroe, the Assistant
Secretary for Civil Rights for the OCR, wrote an official letter” addressed to all
universities through a generic “Dear Colleague” format.139 The Letter’s stated
purpose was to “provide[] clarifying information to help institutions
determine which intercollegiate or interscholastic athletic activities can be
counted for the purpose of Title IX compliance.”140 It reiterated that in
determining whether an institution provides equal athletic opportunities in
compliance with Title IX, the opportunities provided must take place within the
context of an intercollegiate or interscholastic sport.141 However, “OCR does
not have a specific definition of the term ‘sport.’”142 Rather, “OCR
considers several factors related to an activity’s structure, administration, team
preparation and competition . . . when determining whether an activity is a sport
that can be counted as part of an institution’s intercollegiate or
interscholastic athletics program for the purpose of determining compliance
with 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).”143 The Letter proceeded to describe these factors
137. Id.
138. In the meantime, the “DOE issued an Additional Clarification [in 2005], emphasizing that
institutions could demonstrate compliance under any prong of the Three-Part Test.” Equity in Athletics,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 97 (4th Cir. 2011).
139. Glatt, supra note 12, at 305.
140. Monroe, supra note 14, at 1.
141. Id.; see also Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating “that a
genuine athletic participation opportunity must take place in the context of a ‘sport.’”); Biediger v.
Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414, 442 (D. Conn. 2013) (describing the 2008 Letter as
“explain[ing] that, for an athletic activity to be counted in the substantial-proportionality analysis, the
activity must take place in the context of an authentic varsity ‘sport.’”); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ.,
728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 89 (D. Conn. 2010) (noting that pursuant to the 2008 Letter, “for an athletic
participation opportunity to be counted in the substantial proportionality analysis, that participation
opportunity must take place in the context of an intercollegiate varsity ‘sport.’”).
142. Monroe, supra note 14, at 1; see also Glatt, supra note 12, at 305; Jacqueline R. Liguori, Case
Note, Sticking the Landing: How the Second Circuit’s Decision in Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ. Can
Help Competitive Cheerleading Achieve “Sport” Status Under Title IX, 21 JEFFREY S. MOORAD
SPORTS L.J. 153, 162 (2014).
143. Monroe, supra note 14, at 1–2; see also Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89 (quoting Monroe,
supra note 14, at 2).
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in greater detail.
As an initial matter, if the institution is a member of an athletic
organization, such as the NCAA or a state high school athletic association, as
long as the requirements of such organization satisfy the factors set forth in the
Letter and compliance is not discretionary, “OCR will presume that such an
institution’s established sports can be counted under Title IX.”144 However,
“[t]his presumption can be rebutted by evidence demonstrating that the
institution is not offering the activity in a manner that satisfies the factors
below.”145 In those situations where the presumption does not apply or has been
rebutted, “OCR will evaluate an institution’s activit[ies] on a
case-by-case basis [and] consider the factors below to make an overall
determination of whether the activity can be considered part of the institution’s
intercollegiate or interscholastic athletics program for the purpose of Title IX
compliance.”146
These factors are grouped under two main prongs:
(1) program structure and administration, and (2) team preparation and
competition.147
As to program structure and administration, OCR “tak[es] into account the
unique aspects inherent in the nature and basic operation of specific sports, [and]
considers whether the activity is structured and administered in a manner
consistent with established intercollegiate or interscholastic varsity sports in the
institution’s athletics program.”148
Specifically, OCR evaluates the
following components:
A. Whether the operating budget, support services (including
academic, sports medicine and strength and conditioning
support) and coaching staff are administered by the athletics
department or another entity, and are provided in a manner
consistent with established varsity sports; and
B. Whether the participants in the activity are eligible to
receive athletic scholarships and athletic awards (e.g., varsity
144. Monroe, supra note 14, at 2; see also Biediger, 691 F.3d at 93–94; Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d
at 442; Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89–90 (quoting Monroe, supra note 14, at 2); Glatt, supra note 12,
at 305.
145. Monroe, supra note 14, at 2.
146. Id.; see also Biediger, 691 F.3d at 94; Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 442 (noting that OCR will
consider “a multitude of factors” bearing on whether an activity constitutes a sport); Biediger, 728 F.
Supp. 2d at 90 (describing “a bevy of factors” to be considered by OCR in determining whether an
activity amounts to a sport); Glatt, supra note 12, at 305.
147. Monroe, supra note 14, at 2–4.
148. Id. at 2.
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awards) if available to athletes in established varsity sports; to
the extent that an institution recruits participants in its
athletics program, whether participants in the activity are
recruited in a manner consistent with established varsity
sports.149
In terms of team preparation and competition, OCR “tak[es] into account
the unique aspects inherent in the nature and basic operation of specific sports,
[and] considers whether the team prepares for and engages in competition in a
manner consistent with established varsity sports in the institution’s
intercollegiate or interscholastic athletics program.”150 Specifically, OCR
evaluates all of the following factors:
A. Whether the practice opportunities (e.g., number, length and
quality) are available in a manner consistent with
established varsity sports in the institution’s athletics program;
and
B. Whether the regular season competitive opportunities differ
quantitatively and/or qualitatively from established varsity
sports; whether the team competes against intercollegiate or
interscholastic varsity opponents in a manner consistent with
established varsity sports;
When analyzing this factor, the following may be taken into
consideration:
1. Whether the number of competitions and length of play
are predetermined by a governing athletics organization, an
athletic conference, or a consortium of institutions;
2. Whether the competitive schedule reflects the abilities of
the team; and
3. Whether the activity has a defined season; whether the
season is determined by a governing athletics
149. Id.; see also Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 442–43 (quoting Monroe, supra note 14, at 2);
Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 90 (quoting Monroe, supra note 14, at 2); Glatt, supra note 12, at 307 (“A
team may only be counted for Title IX purposes if it receives similar resources to and is organized in a
manner consistent with other university teams. Athletic scholarships and recruiting factor into this part
of the analysis.”) (citation omitted) (citing Monroe, supra note 14).
150. Monroe, supra note 14, at 3.
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organization, an athletic conference, or a consortium.
C. If pre-season and/or post-season competition exists for the
activity, whether the activity provides an opportunity for
student athletes to engage in the pre-season and/or post-season
competition in a manner consistent with established varsity
sports; for example, whether state, national and/or conference
championships exist for the activity; and
D. Whether the primary purpose of the activity is to provide
athletic competition at the intercollegiate or interscholastic
varsity levels rather than to support or promote other athletic
activities.
When analyzing this factor, the following may be taken into
consideration:
1. Whether the activity is governed by a specific set of rules
of play adopted by a state, national, or conference
organization and/or consistent with established varsity
sports, which include objective, standardized criteria by
which competition must be judged;
2. Whether resources for the activity (e.g., practice and
competition schedules, coaching staff) are based on the
competitive needs of the team;
3. If post-season competition opportunities are available,
whether participation in post-season competition is
dependent on or related to regular season results in a
manner consistent with established varsity sports; and
4. Whether the selection of teams/participants is based on
factors related primarily to athletic ability.151

151. Id. at 3–4 (footnote omitted); see also Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 443 (quoting Monroe, supra
note 14, at 3–4); Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 90–91. Or, as one author put it:
An “athletic opportunity” exists only when a team has competitive opportunities that
match those of other university teams. If the team in question’s schedule, postseason
play, or practice opportunities are incomparable to those of other university teams,
then the questionable group does not qualify as a sports team for the purposes of Title
IX. This focus on competition leads to an inquiry into the availability of opponents
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Assistant Secretary Monroe concluded the letter with the following:
It is OCR’s policy to encourage compliance with the Title IX
athletics regulations in a flexible manner that expands, rather
than limits, student athletic opportunities. By disseminating
this list of factors, OCR intends to provide institutions with
information to include new sports in their athletics programs,
such as those athletic activities not yet recognized by
governing athletics organizations and those featured at the
Olympic games, if they so choose. Expanding interscholastic
and intercollegiate competitive athletic opportunities through
new sports can benefit students by creating and stimulating
student interest in athletics, taking advantage of athletic
opportunities specific to a particular competitive region, and
providing the opportunity for access to a wide array of
competitive athletic activities.152
Although the 2008 Letter sets forth in detail the factors used to determine
whether an activity is a sport, it does not indicate how those factors should be
balanced.153 Instead, “how those factors are balanced will depend on the
circumstances of each case, and th[e] balancing should always be performed
with an eye towards whether the participants in a putative sport are receiving
genuine athletic participation opportunities provided to athletes in other
established varsity sports.”154
F.

Cheerleading as a Sport

One activity that has often tested the parameters of what constitutes a sport
is cheerleading. Almost since the inception of Title IX, agencies, courts, and
scholars have debated whether cheerleading may be counted as a sport,
from other institutions. Without an adequate pool of possible competitors from other
universities, the sport in question cannot count as an “athletic opportunity.”
Glatt, supra note 12, at 307 (footnotes omitted) (citing Monroe, supra note 14).
152. Monroe, supra note 14, at 4; Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (quoting Monroe, supra note 14,
at 4).
153. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 100.
154. Id.; see also Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 443 (“Whether an activity is a ‘sport’ will depend on
the facts specific to the institution and will be decided based on the totality of those factors.”).
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whether for reasons of Title IX compliance or for other purposes.
1. Agency Pronouncements
OCR first addressed cheerleading as early as 1975. In a letter to various
school and university officials, Peter E. Holmes, Director of OCR, stated that
“drill teams, cheerleaders and the like, which are covered more generally as
extracurricular activities . . . are not a part of the institution’s ‘athletic
program’ within the meaning of the regulation.”155
Following this
pronouncement, OCR did not address cheerleading again for another
twenty-five years. In April 2000, Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea, National
Coordinator for Title IX Athletics for OCR, wrote to the Executive Director of
the Minnesota State High School League, reiterating that “[c]onsistent with
earlier policy statements, there is a presumption by OCR that cheerleading and
other like activities are extracurricular activities and are not considered sports
for Title IX purposes.”156
Following a request from the Minnesota State High School League for
further clarification, Dr. O’Shea wrote a second letter, dated May 24, 2000. In
this letter, Dr. O’Shea acknowledged that Title IX “does not provide
definitions for . . . ‘cheerleading’ and ‘other like activities,’ nor does OCR have
definitions of these activities.”157 However, OCR took the position that “the
term cheerleading in this context includes both competitive and sideline cheer;
other like activities would include all extracurricular activities similar to drill
teams and cheerleading, such as danceline, skateline, and pep squads.”158
155. Memorandum from Peter E. Holmes, Dir., Office for Civil Rights, to Chief State Sch. Officers,
Superintendents of Local Educ. Agencies & Coll. & Univ. Presidents, at 4 (Sept. 1975) (on file with
the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare/Offices for Civil Rights); see also
McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 282 n.8 (2d Cir. 2004)
(quoting Memorandum from Peter E. Holmes to Chief State Sch. Officers, supra note 155); Biediger,
928 F. Supp. 2d at 445 n.37 (stating that HEW ruled in 1975 that cheerleading was an extracurricular
activity and not a sport); Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 91 n.23 (stating that HEW ruled in 1975 that
cheerleading was an extracurricular activity and not a sport); Glatt, supra note 12, at 308 (noting that
OCR warned schools in 1975 “that . . . cheerleading . . . may not be considered part of an institution’s
‘athletic program.’”); Liguori, supra note 142, at 163 (“As early as 1975, OCR took the position that
cheerleading was presumptively not a sport.”).
156. Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to David V. Stead, supra note 129; Biediger, 928 F.
Supp. 2d at 445 (quoting Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to David V. Stead, supra note 129);
Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (quoting Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to David V. Stead, supra
note 129); Glatt, supra note 12, at 308.
157. Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea, Nat’l Coordinator for Title IX Athletics, Office for Civil
Rights, to David V. Stead, Exec. Dir., Minn. State High Sch. League (May 24, 2000) (on file with the
United States Department of Education).
158. Id.; see also Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2012) ([I]n 2000, OCR had
issued two letters stating that cheerleading, whether of the sideline or competitive variety, was
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Indeed, over the years, several athletic associations asked OCR to evaluate
whether sideline and competitive cheerleading could be considered part of a
school’s athletic program, and “[i]n each case, based on the information
submitted for evaluation, OCR did not recognize as a sport any of the
identified activities.”159
Such was the case in 2009, when OCR investigated a complaint that
Foster High School (Foster) in the Tukwila School District (Tukwila) in
Washington discriminated against its female high school students by not
providing them with equal athletic participation opportunities in its sports
programs.160 In defending against the allegations, Tukwila asserted that OCR
should count participants in the Foster cheer program in determining the
district’s compliance with Title IX.161 During the relevant time period, twelve
girls participated in Foster’s cheer program. 162
The Washington
Interscholastic Activities Association (WIAA), the governing state athletic
association, allowed its member schools to offer cheerleading as either a sport
or an activity, and published rules governing cheer programs.163 The
applicable rules for cheerleading as a sport set the dates of the regular season
from November 3 through January 24, set the minimum number of practice days
at ten, and set the maximum number of interscholastic contests during the
season at ten.164 The WIAA sponsored a cheerleading state championship.165
To qualify, a squad must have performed in at least ten school events,
participated in at least one WIAA or school-sponsored competition, and
presumptively not a sport, and that team members could not be counted as athletes under Title IX.”);
Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 445 (quoting Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to David V. Stead,
supra note 157); Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 91–92 (quoting Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to
David V. Stead, supra note 157); Glatt, supra note 12, at 308 (referring to Letter from Dr. Mary Frances
O’Shea to David V. Stead, supra note 157).
159. Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to David V. Stead, supra note 157; Biediger, 691 F.3d
at 94 (observing that “since 2000, OCR has never recognized an intercollegiate varsity cheerleading
program to be a sport for Title IX purposes.”); Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 445 (noting that “the OCR
has never held a varsity cheerleading . . . program to be a sport for Title IX purposes”); Biediger, 728
F. Supp. 2d at 92 (stating “that, since 2000, OCR has never held an intercollegiate varsity cheerleading
program to be a sport for Title IX purposes.”).
160. Letter from Gary D. Jackson, Dir., Seattle Office, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Herb Dempsey, at 1
(Dec. 16, 2009) (on file with Author).
161. Id. at 3.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. A separate set of rules governed cheerleading as an activity. Id. These rules created a
WIAA spirit committee, allowed the relevant season and practices to be defined by individual school
districts, designated the winter season as competitive cheerleading season, and stated that “cheerleading
activities should center on the leading or directing of fans.” Id.
165. Id.
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achieved a minimum qualifying score.166
Foster’s cheerleading team “served as both [a] spirit and competitive
squad[.]”167 Its athletic conference the Seamount League considered cheer a
year-round activity, but did not hold its own cheer competitions.168 The
district’s “cheerleading squad participated in two competitions during the
2007–2008 school year but did not participate in any competitions during the
2008–2009 school year.”169 The 2008–2009 “squad performed at all home and
away football and boys’ and girls’ basketball games[,]” as well as monthly
school assemblies.170 Team members were required to pay approximately $600
to participate in these activities.171 The payments were for items such as
“form-fitting uniforms, embroidered warm-ups, embroidered briefs, beanies,
sports bra, raincoat, shoes, bags, and pom-poms.”172 In contrast, “[p]articipants
on the school’s other athletic teams did not have a requirement that they pay to
participate. For those sports, each team member purchased his or her shoes but
was not required to purchase his or her uniform or warm-ups.”173 The district’s
high school produced its own cheerleading guidelines, which stated that
[T]he mission of the cheerleading squad is to promote and
uphold school spirit, unity, and pride; to represent the school to
the highest degree; to set an example of good behavior and
sportsmanship at all times, whether in uniform or not; and to
encourage school spirit and pride in the school.174
The guidelines made no mention of cheerleading competition.175
In determining whether Tukwila provided equal athletic opportunities, OCR
looked at whether the opportunities were provided in the context of a “sport.”176
OCR again stressed that it

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 4.
169. Id.
170. Id. “During the . . . school year, there were . . . 9 football [games], 23 boys [sic] basketball
[games], and 23 girls [sic] basketball games.” Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 5.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 8.
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does not use a specific definition of the term sport but instead
considers several factors related to an activity’s structure,
administration, team preparation, and competition, when
determining whether an activity is a sport that OCR counts as part
of a district’s interscholastic athletics program for the purpose of
determining compliance with 34 C.F.R. 106.41(c)(1).177
In the case at hand, OCR decided not to include Foster’s cheerleading
program “as an athletic activity for purposes of determining the [female]
participation rate[] . . . in the district’s interscholastic athletics program.”178
OCR delineated the following considerations in support of its determination:
Participants in the district’s cheerleading . . . program[] are
required to pay a substantial fee in order to participate; there is
no competition within the Seamount League; the squads
participate in a limited number of competitions; the mission,
guidance, and rules for the activities emphasize performance
rather than competition; and the focus of the activities is on
supporting the school’s sports rather than competition.179
Therefore, based on its weighing of the numerous factors, OCR found that
“on balance” Foster’s cheerleading program was not a sport because it was “not
comparable” to the district’s “established varsity sports.”180
In sum, there is not a single instance to date in which OCR found any form
of intercollegiate varsity cheerleading program—competitive or otherwise—to
be a sport for Title IX purposes.181 However, notwithstanding the consistent
pattern of contrary pronouncements and determinations detailed above, OCR
has not completely foreclosed the possibility of cheerleading one day being
considered a sport whose participants may be counted for purposes of Title IX.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 5.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 8; see also Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 446–47.
181. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2012); Biediger v. Quinnipiac
Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414, 445 (D. Conn. 2013); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62,
92 (D. Conn. 2010); cf. Kristina Sowder et al., Defining “Sport,” MOMENTUM MEDIA (Feb./Mar.
2004), http://www.momentummedia.com/articles/am/am1602/cheerdefine.htm (“[D]espite popularity
and an increasingly competitive focus, dance and cheerleading are not uniformly recognized as sports
by the Office for Civil Rights (OCR), the NCAA, the NFHS, or the Women’s Sports Foundation.”).
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While steadfastly maintaining its presumption that cheerleading activities are
not countable participation opportunities, OCR has always been careful to state
that any determination as to whether a particular school’s program
constitutes a sport must be made on a case-by-case basis.182 This “leav[es] open
the possibility for a different conclusion with respect to a particular cheerleading
program.”183
2. Non-Title IX Case Law
Although Biediger is the first decision to comprehensively analyze
whether cheerleading constitutes a sport for purposes of Title IX, a handful of
cases have discussed the question outside of the Title IX context.184 The
subject appears to arise most frequently in the insurance context. In Garcia v.
St. Bernard Parish School Board,185 the Supreme Court of Louisiana
considered “whether the insurance policy issued to the [defendant] School
Board excluded coverage for an injury sustained by a high school cheerleader
while performing [a] . . . stunt during a football game.”186 The plaintiff was
tossing another cheerleader as part of a maneuver known as a basket toss “when
the tossed cheerleader landed on [plaintiff’s] knee,” injuring her.187 “Plaintiff
filed [a] negligence action against the [School] Board and its general liability
insurer.”188 The policy provision in question stated that “the insurance does not
apply . . . to any person while practicing for or participating in any contest or
exhibition of an athletic or sports nature sponsored by the named insured.”189
“The insurer moved for a summary judgment, asserting that the pertinent policy
provision excluded coverage for [plaintiff’s] injury” because she was
182. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 445; Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea to David V. Stead,
supra note 129.
183. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 103.
184. See, e.g., Wieker v. Mesa Cty. Valley Sch. Dist. #51, No. 05-cv-806-WYD-CBS, 2007 WL
595629, at *5, 8–9 (D. Colo. Feb. 21, 2007) (finding that the defendant school district offered no
authority for counting participants on the cheerleading team as part of the total number of athletic
participants in assessing substantial proportionality, but granting summary judgment to the school
district on the third prong of the three-prong test); McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of
Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 282 n.8 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that while the defendant school district
listed cheerleading as a sport, and plaintiffs did not dispute the categorization, “[t]he case [did] not
require [the court] to make a determination about whether cheerleading . . . [was] a sport within the
meaning of . . . Title IX,” although expressing skepticism that it was).
185. See generally 576 So.2d 975 (La. 1991).
186. Id. at 975.
187. Id. at 976.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 975.
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“participating in an exhibition of a sports nature sponsored by [defendant].”190
In order for the exclusion to apply, the court required the insurer to prove
each of the following:
(1) [T]hat the event in which the person was injured was a
contest or exhibition; (2) that the contest or exhibition was of
an athletic or sports nature; (3) that the contest or exhibition
was sponsored by the named insured; and (4) that the injured
person was practicing for or participating in the contest or
exhibition at the time of the injury.191
“[W]hile conceding that [plaintiff] was not a participant in the football
contest, [the insurer] argue[d] that a cheerleader, while leading cheers at a
football game, is participating in an exhibition and that cheerleading itself is of
an athletic nature.”192
The court disagreed:
The risks normally encountered in a sports contest which the
policy provision clearly intended to exclude under the
circumstances of this case were injuries sustained in the
football game. None of the cases reviewed from other
jurisdictions involved an injury in an exhibition ancillary to the
principal contest sponsored by the insured. While a school
board typically sponsors additional activities incidental to
football contests, such as performances by cheerleaders, bands,
pep squads, flag squads, drill teams and the like, these groups
are not participants in the football contest, and an injury to a
member of these groups during a football game is not clearly
within the contemplation of the policy provision.193
The court conceded that “the policy provision may apply to injuries during
cheerleading contests, either intramural or in competition among several
schools, but here there was no contest and no winner to be chosen.”194
190. Id. at 976.
191. Id. at 976–77.
192. Id. at 977.
193. Id.
194. Id. (emphasis added).
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Moreover, the exclusion could also apply “to injuries during an exhibition of
cheerleading which is an independent event sponsored by the school, but here
there was no . . . cheerleading exhibition independent of the football
contest.”195 However, the court noted that, “even if this cheerleading were an
exhibition contemplated by the [exclusion],” it was not “of an athletic or sports
nature.”196 While the acrobatic stunt in which the plaintiff was participating at
the time of her injury was of an athletic nature, “a cheerleader at a football game,
for most of the game except for a few acrobatic stunts, is not generally engaged
in activities of an athletic or sports nature.”197 Thus, the policy provision at
issue did “not clearly exclud[e] injuries sustained while cheerleading at a
football game sponsored by the named insured.”198
While other courts have likewise concluded that cheerleading should not be
considered a sport,199 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reached a contrary result
based on the language and definitions of a state statute. In Noffke v. Bakke, both
plaintiff and defendant were varsity high school basketball cheerleaders. 200 One
night, the parties were practicing a cheerleading stunt prior to a game, without
any mats.201 During the stunt, plaintiff fell backward and struck her head on the
tile floor, resulting in injury.202 Plaintiff brought suit, alleging that defendant’s
negligence in failing to properly spot her during the stunt caused her injuries.203
Defendant “moved for summary judgment asserting that he was immune from
liability” pursuant to a state statute.204

195. Id.
196. Id. at 977 n.2.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 977.
199. See, e.g., Hinterberger v. Iroquois Sch. Dist., 548 F. App’x 50, 53 n.1 (3d Cir. 2013) (“At the
time of Hinterberger’s accident, the PIAA did not officially recognize cheerleading as a sport and
accordingly did not issue rules pertaining to cheerleading.”); Hinterberger v. Iroquois Sch. Dist., 898
F. Supp. 2d 772, 781 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (“Cheerleading is not an activity sanctioned by the Pennsylvania
Interscholastic Athletic Association, as it is not recognized as a sport. Accordingly, neither the PIAA
nor the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania have adopted any rules or regulations regarding the conduct
of high school cheerleading practices, performances, or competitions.”); Gonzalez v. Univ. Sys. of
N.H., No. 451217, 2005 WL 530806, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2005) (“Cheerleading was not a
sport or athletic event but, rather, a self-governing special interest club with twelve members.”); Hacker
v. Colonial League, 56 Pa. D. & C.4th 281, 287 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2001) (“The Colonial League contends
that it does not recognize cheerleading as a sport, however, it does recognize that it is an activity which
supports and enhances interscholastic athletic contests.”).
200. 2009 WI 10, ¶¶ 3–4, 760 N.W.2d 156.
201. Id. ¶ 3.
202. Id.
203. Id. ¶ 6.
204. Id. ¶ 7 (citing WIS. STAT. § 895.525(4m)(a) (2016)).
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The statute in question, which addressed the liability of contact sport
participants, provided:
A participant in a recreational activity that includes physical
contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams,
including teams in recreational, municipal, high school and
college leagues, may be liable for an injury inflicted on
another participant during and as part of that sport in a tort
action only if the participant who caused the injury acted
recklessly or with intent to cause injury.205
For purposes of the statute, “recreational activity” meant the following:
[A]ny activity undertaken for the purpose of exercise,
relaxation or pleasure, including practice or instruction in any
such activity. “Recreational activity” includes hunting, fishing,
trapping, camping, bowling, billiards, picnicking, exploring
caves, nature study, dancing, bicycling, horseback riding,
horseshoe-pitching, bird-watching, motorcycling, operating an
all-terrain vehicle, ballooning, curling, throwing darts, hang
gliding, hiking, tobogganing, sledding, sleigh riding, snowmobiling, skiing, skating, participation in water sports, weight and
fitness training, sight-seeing, rock-climbing, cutting or removing wood, climbing observation towers, animal training, harvesting the products of nature, sport shooting and any other
sport, game or educational activity.206
Thus, to be entitled to statutory “immunity, a defendant must be
(1) participating in a recreational activity; (2) that recreational activity must
include physical contact between persons; (3) the persons must be
participating in a sport; and (4) the sport must involve amateur teams.”207
The plaintiff argued that the statute “provide[d] immunity only to those
persons . . . competing in a contact sport.”208 Because cheerleading was
neither competitive nor a contact sport, according to the plaintiff, the
205. Id. ¶ 14 (quoting § 895.525(4m)(a)).
206. Id. ¶ 15 (quoting § 895.525(2)).
207. Id. ¶ 16.
208. Id. ¶ 13.
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defendant was not entitled to immunity.209 The defendant countered by
arguing “that the plain language of the statute render[ed] him immune from negligence because cheerleading involve[d] physical contact.”210 The court agreed
with the defendant and held that he was “immune from liability
because he was participating in a recreational activity that includes physical
contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams.”211
The court began its analysis by finding that cheerleading indisputably
constituted a recreational activity.212 Although recognizing that “the question
of whether cheerleading is a sport has apparently ‘been a matter of public
debate,’”213 the court also readily concluded that cheerleading was a sport,
because it was “‘[a]n activity involving physical exertion and skill that is
governed by a set of rules or customs.’”214 It did not matter that the parties were
not engaged in competition at the time of plaintiff’s injury, because, while “a
sport is ‘often undertaken competitively,’ the definition does not
require competition,” neither does the statute.215 Moreover, “cheerleaders
often engage in competition with the opponent’s cheerleaders not only during a
game but also during organized competitions.”216 Finally, the court believed
that to “constru[e] the word ‘sport’ to exclude cheerleading . . . is inconsistent
with the purpose of the statute.”217
Having held that cheerleading constituted both a recreational activity and a
sport, the court further concluded that the parties’ activity involved amateur
teams and physical contact as well.218 Accordingly, because cheerleaders such
as the defendant “participate in a recreational activity that includes physical
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. ¶¶ 3, 58.
212. Id. ¶¶ 13, 16.
213. Id. ¶ 32 n.10.
214. Id. ¶ 32 (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1742
(3d ed. 1992)).
215. Id. ¶ 17 n.3.
216. Id. ¶ 31 n.8.
217. Id. ¶ 32. Indeed, the court felt that the parties themselves had impliedly recognized that
cheerleading constituted a sport by focusing the majority of their arguments on the “physical contact”
requirement of the statute. See id. ¶ 32 n.10.
218. Id. ¶ 23. Specifically, the court noted that “cheerleaders are on amateur teams because a team
is ‘[a] group organized to work together’ and cheerleaders . . . are a group dedicated to leading fan
participation and taking part in competitions.” Id. ¶ 17 (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 214, at
1842). Cheerleading also “involves a significant amount of physical contact between the cheerleaders
that at times results in a forceful interaction between the participants,” including “when one person is
tossed high into the air and then caught by those same tossers.” Id. ¶ 23.

HEFFERAN ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

A SPORTI NG CHANCE

6/14/2016 5:34 PM

621

contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams,” they are immune
from negligence actions.219
Other courts in other jurisdictions have echoed Noffke in construing
cheerleading as a sport, albeit outside the parameters of Title IX.220
III. THE BIEDIGER DECISIONS
In the course of the Biediger litigation, the United States District Court for
the District of Connecticut and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit became the first federal courts to apply OCR’s test for
determining what constitutes a sport for purposes of Title IX.221 The activity at
issue was competitive cheerleading.222 “Competitive cheer[leading] is an
outgrowth of traditional sideline cheerleading. . . . [involving] many of the
moves and techniques that sideline cheer[leaders] . . .” use.223 However, while
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Patterson v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 743 F.3d 1160, 1162 (8th Cir. 2014) (“It may
surprise some to learn that cheerleading is, by some measures, the second most dangerous college sport
in the country.”) (emphasis added); Brindisi v. Regano, 20 F. App’x 508, 510 n.1 (6th Cir. 2001)
(noting, in dicta, that “[c]heerleading is probably as much a sport as those more traditionally conceived
like football and soccer. . . . Cheerleading is more dangerous, in terms of serious injuries per minute
of participation, than all but two mens’ [sic] high school sports. . . . Cheerleaders compete in national
and even international competitions. . . . The internet portal yahoo.com lists ‘cheerleading’ under its
category ‘sports.’” (citations omitted) (citing Fontes v. Irvine Unified Sch. Dist., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521,
524 (1994); Am. Cheerleader, http://www.americancheerleader.com (last visited Mar. 13, 2016));
White v. Cleary, No. 09–4324 (PGS), 2012 WL 924338, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2012) (noting that the
defendant school district recognized cheerleading as a sport and paid cheerleading coaches according
to its coach salary guide); Williams v. Clinton Cent. Sch. Dist., 872 N.Y.S.2d 262, 263 (App. Div.
2009) (“by performing her cheerleading routine on a bare wood gym floor . . . ‘plaintiff assumed the
risks of the sport in which she voluntarily engaged.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Fisher v. Syosset Cent.
Sch. Dist., 694 N.Y.S.2d 691, 691 (App. Div. 1999)); Rendine v. St. John’s Univ., 735 N.Y.S.2d 173,
174 (App. Div. 2001) (finding that “plaintiff assumed the risks of the sport in which she voluntarily
engaged including the obvious risk that she might fall onto the floor while she and her partner were
performing the stunt.”) (emphasis added) (citing Fisher, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 691); Fisher, 694 N.Y.S.2d
at 692 (holding that “plaintiff[], who voluntarily participated in extracurricular, school-sponsored
cheerleading activities, [and] hurt her thumb while practicing a maneuver,” had “assumed the risks of
the sport in which she voluntarily engaged, including the obvious risk that she might fall onto the hard
floor where the team was practicing.”) (emphasis added); see also Sowder et al., supra note 181
(advocating that cheerleading be considered a sport, based on surveys of NCAA schools, because it is
“characterized by fitness . . . [involves] the physical elements that typically define sport (endurance,
strength, power, agility, flexibility),” and has “structure, organization, and competition . . . [and]
identified rules and judging criteria”).
221. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 94 (D. Conn. 2010); Biediger v. Quinnipiac
Univ., 691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2012).
222. Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 439 (recognizing the district court in Biediger as “the first federal
court to consider whether competitive cheer could count as a varsity sport for purposes of gender equity
under Title IX.”).
223. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 78.
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sideline cheerleading primarily involves entertaining audiences and soliciting
crowd responses at other teams’ games, competitive cheerleaders “compete to
win.”224 Competitive cheerleaders do not use the props commonly associated
with sideline cheerleading—items such as pom-poms, megaphones, and
signs.225 They wear uniforms similar to volleyball players, rather than
traditional sideline cheerleading uniforms.226 Finally, competitive cheerleading
“emphasize[s] the more gymnastic elements of sideline cheerleading, such as
aerial maneuvers, floor tumbling, and balancing exercises, to the exclusion of
those activities intended to rally the watching audience.”227
The task before the federal courts in the Biediger litigation was to
determine whether the activity of competitive cheerleading as described above
constituted a sport for purposes of Title IX, so that its participants could be
counted among the genuine athletic participation opportunities provided to
women under the substantial proportionality prong of the three-part test. This
section details the factual background and legal analysis underpinning these
groundbreaking decisions.
A.

The 2010 District Court Decision

In 2006, Quinnipiac University (Quinnipiac) transitioned its athletics
program from NCAA Division II to NCAA Division I. 228 The debt created by
new facilities built in connection with the transition contributed to budgetary
difficulties in the ensuing years.229 In March 2009, Quinnipiac announced plans
to cut its men’s golf team, men’s outdoor track team, and women’s
volleyball team, while adding a new women’s competitive cheerleading team
for the 2009–2010 season.230 Faced with the prospect of having their team
eliminated, five members of the volleyball team along with their coach, filed an
action in federal court alleging that Quinnipiac’s decision to eliminate the

224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Nancy Hogshead-Makar, Hurricane Warning Flag for Olympic Sports: Compliance Practices
in Biediger v. Quinnipiac University Signal a Risk to Women’s and Men’s Olympic Sports, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 465, 481 (2011).
229. See id. at 481–82.
230. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 63. Apparently, Quinnipiac was faced with a space crunch and
wanted to eliminate the volleyball program to free up the facility being used by the team for other
activities. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 471 n.64; Carolyn Davis, Note, Leave It on the Field: Too
Expansive an Approach to Evaluating Title IX Compliance in Biediger v. Quinnipiac University?, 76
BROOK. L. REV. 265, 276 (2010).
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volleyball team violated Title IX and its associated regulations.231 The parties
severed and the district court held a one-week bench trial on the plaintiffs’ claim
“that Quinnipiac discriminate[d] on the basis of sex in its allocation of athletic
participation opportunities.”232
Quinnipiac defended itself against the plaintiffs’ claims of sex
discrimination by relying on the first prong of the three-prong test set forth in
the Policy Interpretation.233 Quinnipiac contended that it was in compliance
with Title IX “because it provides athletic participation opportunities for women
in numbers substantially proportionate to its undergraduate female
enrollment.”234 The first prong was the only prong of the three-prong test raised
by Quinnipiac as a defense; it did not argue that it satisfied either the second or
third prong of the test.235
The court used a two-step analysis to determine whether Quinnipiac
provided substantially proportionate athletic participation opportunities for its
female students.236 Under the first step, the court would “determin[e] which of
the University’s putative varsity athletic participation opportunities should be
counted for Title IX purposes.”237
Only those athletic participation
opportunities that “afford[ed] an athlete a genuine opportunity to participate in
a varsity sport” would be counted.238 Moreover, “[t]o be a genuine
231. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 63. Private actions to enforce Title IX are permitted, because the
statute expressly allows “‘any person aggrieved’ by an agency’s termination of funding based on a
finding of non-compliance with the statute to seek judicial review of such agency action.” Nat’l
Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 88 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1683 (2016)); see also Mansourian v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 964 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010).
232. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
233. Id. at 88.
234. Id.
235. Id. Courts have recognized that “relying exclusively on prong one—and forgoing proof [on
the second and third prongs]—has certain advantages.” Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 438. Establishing
compliance under the second and third prongs usually requires extensive evidentiary production
“concerning a school’s past gender-equity practices, history of program expansion for women, and
assessment of athletic interests over time.” Id. On the other hand, the first prong permits a school to
establish gender equity via a mathematical formula, based solely on its current athletic program. Id.
Accordingly, “a university which does not wish to engage in extensive compliance analysis may stay
on the sunny side of Title IX simply by maintaining gender parity between its student body and its
athletic lineup.” Id. (quoting Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897–98 (1st Cir. 1993)). Therefore,
“as a matter of litigation strategy, singular reliance on prong one allows a defendant-university
concerned about its prior gender-equity record to avoid intrusive discovery on—and public testimony
about—the school’s history of sex discrimination in athletics.” Id. For this reason, among others, the
first prong is the prong most used by defendants in Title IX actions. See Glatt, supra note 12, at 303.
236. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 93–94.
237. Id. at 93.
238. Id.
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participation opportunity, an athlete must participate in a legitimate ‘sport,’
which is assessed by considering the set of factors set forth in the 2008 OCR
Letter.”239 Once the number of genuine athletic participation opportunities was
determined, the court proceeded to the second step of the analysis. This step
consisted of “compar[ing] the percentage of athletic participation
opportunities provided to women to the percentage of women enrolled as
undergraduates,” to determine substantial proportionality.240
1. Deference
The court began with an analysis of the level of deference accorded to the
various relevant administrative pronouncements it would be interpreting. The
court found the 1975 Regulations were a reasonable interpretation of Title IX
promulgated by HEW according to specific congressional delegation and were
therefore entitled to a high level of deference under Chevron.241 Likewise, the
Policy Interpretation was previously deemed “both persuasive and not
unreasonable,” according it deference under either Chevron or Skidmore.242
Other courts similarly found the 1996 Clarification deserving of deference.243
However, no federal court had previously determined the level of
deference to accord the 2000 and 2008 OCR Letters.244 Be that as it may, the
court noted that “there seems to be little question that [it] should defer to [the
Letters] as [a reasonable] interpretation of [OCR’s] own regulations” under
Martin.245 The court found that the Letters “create[d] a reasonable and
persuasive method—best captured by the 2008 OCR Letter, which builds upon
the list of factors first proposed in the April 2000 OCR Letter—for
determining which activities count as sports for Title IX purposes.”246 The court
continued:
The 2008 OCR Letter correctly recognizes that an
239. Id.
240. Id. at 94. The court indicated that substantial proportionality would not be determined purely
from the statistical figure but would also take account of the particular facts and circumstances, “such
as whether any shortage in female athletes is large enough to sustain an independent women’s varsity
team that the University is not presently sponsoring.” Id.
241. Id. at 92.
242. Id. (quoting McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 290
(2d Cir. 2004)).
243. Id. (citing, for example, Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 965 n.9
(9th Cir. 2010)).
244. Id. at 92–93; see also Glatt, supra note 12, at 311.
245. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 93.
246. Id.
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intercollegiate sport is defined not only by the activity’s
athletic elements, but also by its structure, administration, and
the competition it fosters. Put differently, the OCR factors
appropriately weigh not only the physical nature of the
activity itself, but also how the experience of participating in
that activity compares to the experience of participating on
other varsity sports teams. That inquiry is reasonable,
persuasive, and entirely consistent with OCR’s goal of ensuring
not only that female students are offered equal athletic
participation opportunities, but that those participation opportunities are real, and not illusory. For those reasons, I will defer
to the 2000 and 2008 OCR Letters interpreting OCR’s regulations and will use the method they prescribe for determining
whether an activity may be treated as a sport under Title IX.247
2. Whether Competitive Cheerleading Is a “Sport”
Having determined that all of the relevant agency pronouncements were
entitled to at least some level of deference, the court proceeded to consider
whether competitive cheerleading constituted a sport pursuant to the analytical
framework laid out in the 2008 OCR Letter. The first consideration under the
2008 OCR Letter is whether the university is a member of a recognized
intercollegiate athletic association, such as the NCAA, and whether the
activity is governed by that association’s rules.248 If so, there is a presumption
that the activity can be counted as a sport for purposes of Title IX compliance.249
Quinnipiac is a member of NCAA Division I. However, competitive
cheerleading is not a sport recognized by the NCAA.250 Nor have any schools
sponsoring competitive cheerleading teams even applied to the NCAA for
designation of competitive cheerleading as an “emerging sport.”251 Likewise,
247. Id.
248. Id. at 93–94.
249. Id. at 94.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 78, 94. “In 1994, the NCAA adopted the Emerging Sports initiative as part of an overall
effort to promote the growth of women’s sports. . . . The list of emerging sports for women helps
member institutions overcome the challenges of adding new women’s sports.” Buzuvis, supra note 13,
at 454–55. According to the NCAA, “[a]n emerging sport is a sport recognized by the NCAA that is
intended to provide additional athletics opportunities to female student-athletes.” CRITERIA FOR
EMERGING SPORTS, supra note 133. Member institutions may count emerging sports toward “NCAA
minimum sports-sponsorship and . . . minimum financial aid requirements.” Id.; see also Biediger, 728
F. Supp. 2d at 78–79; 2015–16 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 20.02.4 (2015) [hereinafter NCAA
MANUAL]; Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 455. An “[e]merging sport[] may become [an official] NCAA
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DOE does not consider competitive cheerleading a sport for purposes of
reporting athletic participation data under the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act
(EADA).252 Therefore, the court determined that “competitive cheer is not
entitled to any presumption in favor of it being considered a sport under Title
IX.”253 Indeed, in the May 24, 2000 Letter, OCR indicated “cheerleading is
presumptively not a Title IX sport.”254 Therefore, pursuant to the guidelines set
forth in the 2008 OCR Letter, the court proceeded to inquire as to whether
competitive cheerleading should be considered part of Quinnipiac’s
intercollegiate athletic program based on its program structure and
administration, as well as its team preparation and competition.
a. Program Structure and Administration
The first set of factors considered in determining whether an activity
constitutes a sport under Title IX coalesces around program structure and
administration.255 The court found that, in many respects, the competitive cheer
team was structured and administered in the same way as other,
recognized sports.256 For instance, the “team’s operating budget, benefits and
services, and coaching staff are administered by the athletics department in a
manner consistent with the administration of Quinnipiac’s other varsity
teams.”257 Team members also received benefits and services on par with
other varsity teams in areas such as equipment, medical treatment, strength and
conditioning coaching, study halls, community service opportunities,
publicity, and eligibility to receive awards and recognition for their
participation.258 “[T]he . . . coaching staff was administered like the coaching
championship sport[] if at least forty member institutions add the emerging sport within a ten-year
period,” although exceptions are sometimes granting if the sport is making “‘steady progress’ toward
that goal.” Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 455; see also CRITERIA FOR EMERGING SPORTS, supra note 133.
Current championship sports that originated on the list of emerging sports include rowing, ice hockey,
water polo, and bowling. Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 455. For the 2015–2016 academic year, the NCAA
lists only rugby, equestrian, and triathlon as emerging sports. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 251, art.
20.02.4(a)–(b).
252. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 79. “The EADA is a law separate from Title IX that requires an
educational institution receiving federal funding and participating in intercollegiate athletics to report
its athletic participation data for men and women to the Department of Education.” Id. at 79 n.18 (citing
20 U.S.C. § 1092(g) (2016)); see also Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 422 n.8 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1092(g)).
253. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 94.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 95.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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staff of other Quinnipiac varsity [teams].”259 Finally, while not recognized by
the NCAA as a varsity sport, “the Quinnipiac competitive cheer team still
followed applicable NCAA rules, such as . . . practice time restrictions” and
medical clearance requirements, just like Quinnipiac’s established varsity
sports.260
However, the court also found several areas in which the competitive cheer
team diverged from the typical varsity program at Quinnipiac. For instance, the
team did not receive locker room space like other varsity teams.261 Moreover,
unlike other varsity sports at the school, as a non-recognized sport, competitive
cheer was not covered by the NCAA’s insurance program, and had to buy its
own catastrophic insurance coverage from a separate provider.262 Most
importantly, in contrast to every other varsity sport at Quinnipiac, not a single
member of the competitive cheer team was recruited off campus, because the
team’s coach had not passed the NCAA recruitment examination.263
b. Team Preparation and Competition.
The court then turned to an examination of the relevant factors relating to
team preparation and competition. Pursuant to the criteria established by the
2008 OCR Letter, the court examined
(1) the quality of the team’s practice opportunities; (2) whether the
regular season differs quantitatively or qualitatively from the regular
seasons of other varsity sports; (3) whether the pre- and post-seasons
are consistent with other varsity sports; and (4) whether the team is
organized primarily for the purpose of engaging in athletic
competition.264
The court found no question that two of the factors favored treating
259. Id.
260. Id. at 81.
261. Id. at 81–82.
262. Id. at 82, 95.
263. Id. at 80, 95. The head coach of Quinnipiac’s competitive cheer team, Mary Ann Powers, was
formerly the coach of Quinnipiac’s sideline cheer team. Id. at 80. At the time she accepted the position
in 2009, Powers was not familiar with the applicable NCAA and conference recruiting rules and was
not cleared to recruit any athletes off campus until she passed the NCAA recruitment examination for
coaches in the spring of 2010. Id. Notwithstanding her inability to recruit off campus, Powers believed
that her on-campus recruiting was sufficient to field a competitive team for the 2009–2010 season. Id.
at 81.
264. Id. at 96.
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competitive cheerleading as a sport.265 First, “the team’s practices [were]
similar to the practice regimen for other varsity squads.”266 Quinnipiac also
satisfied the fourth factor, as the primary purpose of the competitive
cheerleading team was “to compete athletically at the intercollegiate varsity
level.”267 However, there were major distinctions between the competitive
cheerleading team and Quinnipiac’s other varsity sports as to the remaining two
factors, differences the court ultimately found dispositive.268
First, the court compared the regular season of Quinnipiac’s competitive
cheer team to the regular seasons of the school’s other varsity sports.269
According to the 2008 OCR Letter, in analyzing this factor, the following
considerations were relevant: “whether the number of competitions and length
of play are predetermined by a governing athletics organization, conference, or
consortium of institutions; whether the competitive schedule reflects the team’s
abilities; and whether the activity’s season is defined by a governing athletics
organization, conference, or consortium.”270
Quinnipiac partially satisfied these criteria: along with seven other schools,
it had “joined and helped establish [an] intercollegiate competitive cheer
organization [known as] the National Competitive Stunt and Tumbling
Association (NCSTA).”271 For the 2009–2010 season, the NCSTA determined
that the competitive cheer season would last 132 days and that each team would
compete in at least eight contests, including the championship, which would be
the National Cheerleading Association (NCA) national championship event in
Daytona Beach, Florida, in April 2010.272 “[T]he NCSTA developed an initial
set of rules for its competitions during the 2009–10 season.”273 However,
despite their agreement on these measures, as well as their common belief that
competitive cheer teams should only engage in competition and not support
other varsity teams in a sideline capacity, the organization remained “a loosely
defined, unincorporated association with no board of directors, subcommittees,
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 99.
268. Id. at 96–97.
269. Id. at 97.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 82.
272. Id. at 82–83.
273. Id. at 83. The rules established a scoring system for competitions similar to gymnastics and
figure skating. Id. Teams would select a routine with a predetermined score value to perform at each
event, and “whether the team[] [met] that score [would] depend[] on the quality and accuracy of [its]
execution.” Id. “Scores [would be] determined by [a] panel[] of five judges.” Id.
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voting or petition systems for its members, or other hallmarks of a governing
national athletics organization.”274 Moreover, the NCSTA “did not establish a
maximum number of competitive cheer competitions; rules for what kind of
teams its member schools could play against; or what kinds of scoring systems
would be permissible at non-NCSTA competitive cheer competitions.”275 Nor
did it appear that the rules that the NCSTA established were even enforceable;
the court found no evidence that the NCSTA could penalize its member schools
for violating the organization’s agreement.276
As a result of these deficiencies, “the 2009–10 Quinnipiac competitive
cheer season was marked by inconsistency in terms of whom the University
competed against and what scoring system was applied.”277 The team
participated in ten competitions during the 2009–2010 regular season, but only
two of them were conducted under the auspices of the NCSTA.278 Because the
competitive cheer season was not governed by a single overseeing body, such
as the NCAA, the rules varied from competition to competition.279 Indeed, those
ten contests were conducted according to at least five different scoring rules.280
The court found that “[n]o other varsity sport was subject to multiple sets of
governing bodies, and every other Quinnipiac varsity team could
prepare for games knowing that the rules of competition would remain
constant.”281
Moreover, Quinnipiac’s competitive cheer team did not play a schedule that
reflected its participants’ abilities.282 In its ten regular season contests, the team
competed against a variety of different opponents, “including other
collegiate varsity competitive cheer squads, collegiate club competitive cheer
squads, collegiate sideline cheer teams, all-star squads, and even high school
cheerleaders.”283 No other varsity team at Quinnipiac played against

274. Id. at 82.
275. Id. at 97.
276. Id. “Indeed, the NCSTA could not even threaten . . . violators . . . [with a] postseason
[ban]—a stick that the NCAA uses to deter and punish its member schools for violating its
rules—because the 2009–10 post-season was administered by NCA—a third party . . . over which the
NCSTA had no authority.” Id.
277. Id. at 83.
278. See id. at 84, 97.
279. Id. at 97.
280. Id. at 84, 97.
281. Id. at 97.
282. Id.
283. Id.; see also id. at 84.
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non-varsity—indeed, in certain cases, non-collegiate—competition.284
Because “[n]o other Quinnipiac varsity team is forced to play such a motley
assortment of competitors . . . it cannot be doubted that the quality of
competition is more variant across the competitive cheer season than across the
seasons of the University’s other varsity teams.”285
Not only was the competitive cheer team’s regular season different from the
school’s other varsity sports, but its postseason differed significantly from
established varsity sports as well.286 As mentioned above, for the 2009–2010
season, the competitive cheerleading postseason consisted of competing in the
NCA national championship event.287 This event “was open to all schools’
cheerleading teams; there was no progressive playoff system or entrance
qualification, such as a ranking system or minimum win tally over the course of
the season.”288 Indeed, “being a competitive cheerleading team was not a
prerequisite to participating in the NCA event.”289 Although Quinnipiac
competed only against other competitive cheer teams at the NCA
championship, the teams “were not ranked, seeded, or winnowed in any way.”290
The teams were simply “pitted against each other in a single
championship round in which the team with the highest score won. How those
schools fared in their regular season was irrelevant to their success.”291
A further issue related to the NCA event was its “fail[ure] to provide a form
of competition in keeping with Quinnipiac’s season.”292 The rules for the NCA
event required teams to participate in a “spirit” segment in which their success
would be judged by the intensity of the crowd response they
elicited and the number of sponsor props they used.293 At no point in the
regular season had the team’s score ever been determined by its ability to elicit
a crowd reaction, which is a hallmark of sideline, not competitive cheer. 294
Needless to say, “[n]o other varsity sport at Quinnipiac introduces a new
scoring system or element of competition in its championship that was not

284. Id. at 97–98.
285. Id. at 98.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 98–99.
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present during the regular season.”295 Thus, the differences between the
competitive cheer team and Quinnipiac’s other varsity sports as to both regular
season and postseason competition counseled against a determination that
competitive cheerleading constituted a sport for Title IX purposes.296
In sum, while certain aspects of Quinnipiac’s competitive cheer program
compared favorably to other varsity sports, “other factors relating to the
structure, administration, team preparation, and competition” supported a
finding that, “at this point in time, the University’s competitive cheer team
cannot count as a sport under Title IX.”297 The court then balanced the various
factors, with an eye towards whether the members of the competitive cheer team
“are receiving genuine athletic participation opportunities equivalent to the
opportunities provided to athletes in other established varsity sports.”298 The
court believed that the three deciding factors in the analysis were the
competitive cheer team’s inability to recruit off campus; its inconsistent
regular season, in terms of both the rules governing team competitions, as well
as the type and quality of opponents; and its “aberrant” postseason, involving a
new form of competition and no entrance qualification or progressive playoff
system.299 These factors led the court “to conclude that the women’s
competitive cheer team was not a varsity sport under Title IX.”300
Notwithstanding the court’s conclusion that Quinnipiac’s competitive cheer
team, as currently constituted, would not be counted as a sport for Title IX
purposes, it is important to note that the court did not close the door
entirely on the issue. While “the activity is still too underdeveloped and
disorganized to be treated as offering genuine varsity athletic participation
opportunities for students,” competitive cheerleading “may, some time in the
future, qualify as a sport for the purposes of Title IX.”301 Indeed, the court
expressed
little doubt that at some point in the near future—once
competitive cheer is better organized and defined, and surely in
the event that the NCAA recognizes the activity as an emerging
sport—competitive cheer will be acknowledged as a bona fide
295. Id. at 99.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 100.
299. Id. at 99–100.
300. Id. at 100.
301. Id. at 64.
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sporting activity by academic institutions, the public, and the
law.302
However, “that time has not yet arrived,” and, accordingly, Quinnipiac
could not yet count the members of its competitive cheer team as genuine
athletic participation opportunities for purposes of compliance with the
substantial proportionality prong of the three-part test for Title IX
compliance.303
3. Substantial Proportionality
Having determined which athletic participation opportunities would be
counted, the court then proceeded to compare the percentage of athletic
participation opportunities provided to women to the percentage of women
enrolled as undergraduates, to determine substantial proportionality. For the
2009–2010 school year, of the 5,686 students enrolled at Quinnipiac, 2,168
students, or 38.13%, were male, while 3,518 students, or 61.87%, were
female.304 Quinnipiac argued that even after eliminating the women’s
volleyball team, it still offered athletic participation opportunities for women
substantially proportional to the university’s female undergraduate

302. Id. at 101. Quinnipiac provided evidence of various changes instituted by the NCSTA for the
2010–2011 season in an effort to convince the court that competitive cheerleading constituted a sport.
See id. at 84–85. For instance, in 2010–2011, the NCSTA held its championship independent of the
NCA, required its schools to compete in six competitions, at least half of which had to follow NCSTA
rules and format and be against at least one other collegiate team, and determined that NCSTA
membership would be available to all competitive cheer teams sponsored as varsity teams, as well as
to club teams at schools committed to sponsoring them as varsity programs eventually. Id. The NCSTA
also agreed to “apply to the NCAA for competitive cheer to be recognized as an emerging sport.” Id.
at 85. However, every NCSTA team would still qualify to compete at the new championship event,
regardless of record. See id. at 84. Moreover, the NCSTA still “has not[] created a permanent set of
bylaws to govern competitive cheer,” with its “rules remain[ing] somewhat in flux.” Id. at 85. Nor did
Quinnipiac seek a letter from OCR determining that its competitive cheer team counted as athletic
participants for purposes of Title IX. Id. Finally, as Quinnipiac conceded, competitive cheer could not
be approved as an emerging sport because there were not yet sufficient teams to meet the NCAA’s
requirements. Id. The most recent edition of the NCAA Division I Manual still does not list
competitive cheer as an emerging sport. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 251, art. 20.02.4(a)–(b).
Thus, the court remained unconvinced that the changes would be adequate to support a
conclusion that competitive cheerleading could count as a sport under Title IX for the 2010–2011
season. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 113.
303. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 101.
304. Id. at 64. This ratio presented a significant hurdle to Quinnipiac’s attempt to demonstrate
substantial proportionality, especially since NCAA Division I schools must offer at least fourteen
sports, no fewer than six of which are for men. Hogshead-Makar, supra note 228, at 482.
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enrollment.305 According to Quinnipiac’s numbers, it had 282 female athletes
out of 450 athletes overall for the 2009–2010 school year.306 These figures
would “result[] in 62.67 percent of the school’s athletic participation
opportunities being assigned to women,” which would satisfy the substantial
proportionality prong.307 However, based on its conclusion that competitive
cheerleading did not constitute a sport providing genuine athletic participation
opportunities for purposes of Title IX, the court removed all thirty members of
the competitive cheer team from Quinnipiac’s count of female participation
opportunities, along with eleven additional athletes.308 After making these
reductions, the court found that females comprised 61.87% of Quinnipiac’s
undergraduate enrollment, but received only 58.25% of the school’s athletic
participation opportunities—a disparity of 3.62%.309
The court then determined whether the 3.62% disparity in the percentage of
athletic participation opportunities offered to females was nevertheless
sufficient to be considered substantial proportionality for purposes of
satisfying the first prong and acknowledged that the difference represented, “in
strictly numeric terms, a borderline case of disproportionate athletic
opportunities for women.”310 However, based upon the guidance of the 1996
Clarification, “raw numbers are only part of the analysis for whether the
participation of women in a school’s varsity program is proportional to
enrollment.”311 OCR also established “other factors designed to give context
and meaning to a school’s shortfall of athletic opportunities for students of a
specific sex.”312 Specifically, the court needed to focus on “whether natural
fluctuations in enrollment contributed to the lack of proportionality, and
whether the absolute number of athletic participation opportunities that need to
be created to achieve exact proportionality would be sufficient to sustain a
viable athletic team.”313
As to the first of these factors, “there is no indication that the disparity is
305. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 86.
306. Id. at 87.
307. Id. at 65, 87.
308. Id. at 111. The additional eleven athletes removed by the court from the tally of female athletic
participation opportunities were cross-country runners who the court refused to “double count” as
indoor and outdoor track participants, where those individuals were injured or red-shirted during the
indoor and outdoor track seasons. See id. at 73-78, 111.
309. Id. at 111.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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attributable to a surge of women enrolling at Quinnipiac,”314 nor could the
disparity “be attributed to any unanticipated drop in female athletic
participation or spike in male athletic participation.”315 Quinnipiac imposed
carefully selected roster targets for all of its teams and “took meticulous steps
to ensure that its roster targets were met over the course of the year.”316 Thus,
there were “no natural fluctuations in Quinnipiac’s enrollment or [athletic
participation] that would explain the disparity.”317
As to the second additional factor, the court found that “the 3.62 percent
disparity represent[ed] a shortfall of approximately 38 female athletes.”318 This
would be more than enough to sustain an additional female varsity team. 319
Indeed, such a team already existed—the women’s volleyball team the school
was trying to eliminate. Accordingly, “[a]lthough a [sic] 3.62 percent is not an
overwhelming disparity, it is sufficient to show an absence of substantial
proportionality on the facts of this case.”320
Based on all of the above, the 3.62% disparity in female athletic
participation opportunities established that “Quinnipiac did not offer athletic
participation opportunities for women that were substantially proportional to the
University’s female enrollment,” and, therefore, “does not fall within the 1979
Policy Interpretation’s first safe harbor for Title IX compliance.”321 The court
held, as a matter of law, that Quinnipiac violated Title IX and
“discriminated on the basis of sex during the 2009–2010 academic year by
failing to provide equal athletic participation opportunities for women.”322
As a remedy, the court “enjoined [Quinnipiac] from continuing to
discriminate against its female students on the basis of sex by failing to
provide equal athletic participation opportunities.”323 It also ordered Quinnipiac
to “submit a compliance plan describing how it will bring itself into Title IX
compliance for 2010–2011 and thereafter.”324 The compliance plan had to
commit to sponsoring a women’s volleyball team for at least the 2010–2011

314. Id. at 111–12.
315. Id. at 112.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 113.
321. Id. at 112–13.
322. Id. at 64; see also id. at 113.
323. Id. at 114.
324. Id. at 113.
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school year.325
B.

The Second Circuit Decision

Quinnipiac appealed the district court’s injunction to the Second
Circuit.326 The school argued that the district court erred by excluding all
thirty roster positions on the competitive cheer team from its tally of female
athletic participation opportunities, on the basis that it was not a varsity sport
for Title IX purposes.327 Even if those athletes were not counted, Quinnipiac
further contended that the district court erred in finding the resulting 3.62%
disparity between the percentage of participation opportunities afforded
female athletes and the percentage of female undergraduate enrollment to
constitute a Title IX violation.328
Where an appellant challenges the “basis [of injunctive relief] in law and
fact, [an appellate court] review[s] the district court’s factual findings only for
clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.”329 Like the district court, the
Second Circuit began its analysis of the substantial proportionality prong, the
only prong on which Quinnipiac elected to defend itself,330 by determining the
number of participation opportunities afforded by the school’s intercollegiate
athletic program to male and female athletes.331 Also like the district court, the
Second Circuit
conclude[d] that the 1996 Clarification . . . and the 2000 and
2008 OCR Letters [were] likewise entitled to substantial
deference under Auer v. Robbins332 . . . because they reflect reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguities in its own
regulation, and there is no reason to think that the agency’s
interpretations do not reflect its “fair and considered judgment
325. Id. at 114.
326. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2012).
327. Id. at 91, 96.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 96. While the district court’s “finding of sex discrimination [was] incorporated in a
declaratory judgment that [was] not yet final and . . . appealable,” the Second Circuit determined that
it “nevertheless ha[d] jurisdiction to review the finding because it [was] ‘inextricably intertwined’ with
the challenged injunctive relief over which [the court did possess] interlocutory appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).” Id. (citing Lamar Advert. of Penn, LLC v. Town of Orchard Park,
356 F.3d 365, 371-72 (2d Cir. 2004)).
330. Id. at 98.
331. Id. at 93.
332. See generally 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
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on the matter in question.”333
Moreover, “even if . . . the 1996 Clarification and [2000 and 2008 OCR L]etters
were not entitled to Auer deference, they would be entitled to substantial
deference under United States v. Mead Corp.334 because their logical
consistency with the agency’s earlier 1979 Policy Interpretation amplifies their
‘power to persuade.’”335
1. Whether Competitive Cheerleading Constitutes a “Sport”
After establishing the legal framework, the Second Circuit provided a
detailed description of the district court’s application and analysis of the
various factors set forth in the 2008 OCR Letter that went into its conclusion
that the members of the competitive cheer team could not be counted under Title
IX, because the activity did not afford the participation opportunities of a varsity
sport.336 “Quinnipiac question[ed] the weight the district court assigned the
various factors it identified as supporting or undermining recognition of
competitive cheer[] as a genuine varsity sport” for Title IX purposes and also
asserted that the court should review the issue de novo.337 While the Second
Circuit “generally accord[s] considerable discretion to a factfinder in deciding
what weight to assign competing evidence pointing toward different
conclusions,” the issue was irrelevant.338 This was because

333. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 96–97 (footnote added) (citation omitted) (quoting Mullins v. City of
New York, 653 F.3d 104, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2011)). In Auer v. Robbins, where Congress had not directly
spoken on the issue, the Supreme Court determined that it “must sustain the Secretary [of Labor’s
interpretation of an overtime wage exemption] so long as it is ‘based on a permissible construction of
the statute.’” Auer, 519 U.S. at 457 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)). Because the test used by the Secretary was “a creature of the Secretary’s
own regulations, his interpretation of it,” which “simply cannot be said to be unreasonable,” was
“controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” Id. at 458, 461 (quoting
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
334. See generally 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
335. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 97 (footnote added) (citation omitted) (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2169 (2012)). United States v. Mead Corp. found “room at least to
raise a Skidmore claim [of deference] here, where the regulatory scheme is highly detailed, and [the
agency] can bring the benefit of specialized experience to bear on” the subtle questions at issue. Mead,
533 U.S. at 235. An agency ruling in such a “situation may therefore at least seek a respect proportional
to its ‘power to persuade.’” Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). “Such
a ruling may surely claim the merit of its writer’s thoroughness, logic, and expertness, its fit with prior
interpretations, and any other sources of weight.” Id.
336. See Biediger, 691 F.3d at 102–05.
337. Id. at 105.
338. Id.
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[E]ven assuming that de novo review were warranted, we
conclude for the same reasons stated in detail by the district
court and summarized in this opinion that, although there are
facts on both sides of the argument, in the end, the balance tips
decidedly against finding competitive cheerleading presently to
be a “sport” whose participation opportunities should be
counted for purposes of Title IX.339
Like the district court, the Second Circuit acknowledged “that competitive
cheer[] can be physically challenging, requiring competitors to possess
‘strength, agility, and grace.’”340 Similarly, the Second Circuit did not
“foreclose the possibility that [competitive cheer], with better organization and
defined rules, might some day warrant recognition as a varsity sport.”341
However, the Second Circuit echoed the district court in concluding that “that
time has not yet arrived.”342 Thus, the Second Circuit held “that the district
court was correct not to count the 30 roster positions assigned to competitive
cheerleading in determining the number of genuine varsity athletic participation
opportunities that Quinnipiac afforded female students.”343
2. Substantial Proportionality
The Second Circuit next addressed Quinnipiac’s argument that, even if the
members of the competitive cheerleading team were properly excluded from the
tally of athletic participation opportunities, the resulting 3.62% disparity
between female athletic participation opportunities and female undergraduate
enrollment did not support the finding of a Title IX violation.344 Quinnipiac
asserted that this disparity was too small to support a finding that the school
failed to provide athletic participation opportunities to its female students in
substantial proportion to their enrollment.345 Quinnipiac further argued that it
could not be held “responsible for the disparity in light of fluctuations in

339. Id.
340. Id. (quoting Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 101 (D. Conn. 2010)).
341. Id.
342. Id. (quoting Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 101).
343. Id.
344. Id. at 105–06.
345. Id. at 106.

HEFFERAN ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE)

638

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

6/14/2016 5:34 PM

[Vol. 26:2

enrollment.”346 Finally, “Quinnipiac contend[ed] that the district court
erroneously accorded dispositive weight to the fact that the number of additional
female roster spots needed to achieve exact proportionality—[thirty-eight]—
would have been sufficient for Quinnipiac to field an additional varsity team.”347
The Second Circuit rejected all of Quinnipiac’s contentions.348 First, the
court found the relatively small percentage of the disparity unimportant.349
While the district court conceded that the disparity represented “in strictly
numerical terms . . . a borderline case of disproportionate athletic opportunities,”
the 1996 Clarification made clear that “substantial proportionality is not
determined by any bright-line statistical test.”350 Although no other reported
decision found such a small disparity to constitute a lack of substantial
proportionality, “the 1996 Clarification . . . [did not] create a statistical safe
harbor at [any] . . . percentage,” but “instruct[ed] that substantial proportionality
is properly determined on a ‘case-by-case basis’ after a careful assessment of
the school’s ‘specific circumstances,’ including the causes of the disparity and
the reasonableness of requiring the school to add additional athletic
opportunities to eliminate the disparity.”351 Analyzing precisely these factors,
“the district court pointed to record evidence showing that the 3.62% identified
disparity was almost entirely attributable to Quinnipiac’s own careful control of
its athletic rosters,” and its conclusion should be upheld.352
Finally, the Second Circuit did not interpret the district court’s decision to
categorically hold that “no matter how small a disparity, if it can be closed by
the creation of a new sports team, a school will be found not to have afforded
substantially proportionate athletic opportunities.”353 Rather, the district court
“discussed the possible creation of a new sports team only to explain why it was
reasonable to expect Quinnipiac to add additional athletic opportunities for
women to close the identified 3.62% disparity.”354 Because the gap
reflected thirty-eight positions, and all of Quinnipiac’s currently existing
women’s sports teams had rosters of less than thirty participants, it was
“certain that [a new] sports team could be created from the shortfall.”355
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. (quoting Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 111).
351. Id.
352. Id. at 107.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. (quoting Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 112).
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Indeed, it would take “little effort . . . to afford the additional participation
opportunities of an independent sports team,” because such a team already
existed in the form of the women’s volleyball team the school was trying to
eliminate.356
Based on all of the above reasons, the Second Circuit rejected
Quinnipiac’s contentions on appeal and affirmed the injunction “substantially
for the reasons stated by the district court in its comprehensive and well
reasoned [sic] opinion.”357
C.

The 2013 District Court Opinion

Following the Second Circuit’s affirmance, Quinnipiac subsequently
moved to lift the district court’s injunction, claiming that changes to its
athletics program over the past two years brought it into compliance with Title
IX.358 Specifically, Quinnipiac emphasized the following changes:
(1) [T]he addition of a varsity women’s golf team; (2) the
further cultivation of competitive cheer as a developing sport,
having renamed the activity “acrobatics and tumbling”; (3) the
addition of a varsity women’s rugby team; and (4) the
adoption of a written policy that no student athlete would be
required to join additional teams in order to participate in her
sport of choice—or more specifically, that women’s
cross-country athletes would no longer be required to
participate in women’s indoor and outdoor track.359
Quinnipiac asserted that women’s golf, competitive cheer, rugby, and track
“provide[d] female athletes with genuine varsity participation opportunities,”
and, when these participation opportunities were combined with the school’s
other participation opportunities, as to which there was no dispute, the school
allocated female athletic participation opportunities in numbers substantially
proportionate to its female undergraduate enrollment, in compliance with the
first prong of the three-prong test.360
The court quickly determined that as a full-fledged NCAA championship
356. Id.
357. Id. at 91.
358. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414, 419 (D. Conn. 2013).
359. Id. at 420.
360. Id. at 453.
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sport, women’s golf provided genuine athletic participation opportunities and
counted the golf team’s eleven athletes in its tally.361 The court also decided to
count all but three multisport cross-country athletes who regularly participated
in practice sessions and other team activities, even if they were injured and did
not actually compete in meets.362 Therefore, the bulk of the court’s lengthy
opinion consisted of discussion and analysis related to whether competitive
cheer and rugby athletes could be counted as genuine participation opportunities
for purposes of Title IX compliance.
After retracing the development of the relevant Title IX regulations and
guidelines, the court reaffirmed the analytical framework it used in its earlier
opinion. Because Quinnipiac again proceeded solely under the substantial
proportionality prong of the three-part test, the court’s analysis proceeded in
two steps. First, the court determined the number of genuine varsity athletic
participation opportunities afforded to members of each sex.363 Then, it
calculated “whether the number of participation opportunities is substantially
proportionate to the gender demographics of the university.”364
1. Whether an Activity Constitutes a “Sport”
As to the first step of the analysis, the court determined which
participation opportunities should be counted by focusing on the factors
delineated in the 2008 OCR Letter,365 just as it had in its previous decision:
Under prong one [of the Three-Part Test], the term
“participation opportunities” means the total number of
“participants”—as defined in the 1996 Clarification—engaged
in genuine intercollegiate-level varsity “sports.” Whether a
particular athletic activity qualifies as a “sport” (so that
“participants” in that activity may count for purposes of prong
one) depends on both intrinsic and extrinsic factors, as
outlined in the 2008 OCR Letter. Intrinsic factors concern the
inherent sport-like qualities of the activity, such as (1) whether
the purpose of the activity is athletic competition; (2) whether
361. Id.
362. Id. at 465. The three athletes the court decided not to count quit the indoor track team less than
halfway through the season, without competing in a single event, and so could not be found to have
participated in the activity on a regular basis. Id. at 466.
363. Id. at 440.
364. Id.
365. Consistent with its earlier decision, the court continued to accord the 1996 Clarification and
2000 and 2008 OCR Letters substantial deference. See id. at 445–46.
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competition is judged by a set of rules and objective criteria;
(3) whether participants are selected on the basis of athletic
ability; (4) whether the number of competitions and length of
play are determined by a governing athletics organization; (5)
whether the activity has a defined season; and (6) whether postseason competition, if available, is dependent on regular season
results. Extrinsic factors, in contrast, concern how the putative
sport is administered by the university, including (1) whether
the budget, support services, and coaching are provided in a
manner consistent with established varsity sports; (2) whether
participants are eligible for scholarships and awards; (3)
whether participants are recruited in a manner consistent with
other varsity sports; (4) whether practice opportunities are
consistent with other varsity sports; (5) whether competitive
opportunities differ quantitatively or qualitatively from
established varsity sports, including competition against other
varsity opponents; (6) whether the competitive schedule
reflects the abilities of the team; (7) whether the team
participates in pre-season or post-season competition in a
manner consistent with other varsity sports; and (8) whether
resources for the activity are based on the competitive needs of
the team. Intrinsic factors bear on whether an activity is
capable of providing athletes a genuine varsity participation
opportunity, while extrinsic factors bear on whether a
particular school’s program is organized and administered in a
way that actually provides athletes a genuine varsity
participation opportunity. Accordingly, even if an athletic
activity possesses, in the abstract, all of the intrinsic attributes
of an authentic “sport,” it may nonetheless be offered in such a
manner that its participants do not receive a genuine varsity
experience on par with other bona fide varsity athletes; that is,
the activity, as administered, lacks the extrinsic attributes of an
intercollegiate varsity sport.366
a.

Competitive Cheer.

Turning first to competitive cheer, or “acro,” as Quinnipiac now calls it,367

366. Id. at 444.
367. “Acro” is short for “acrobatics and tumbling.” Id. at 420.
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the court assumed that the activity continued to satisfy all of the factors it found
satisfied in its previous opinion.368 The team’s “budget, benefits and services,
coaching staff, scholarships and awards, and practice opportunities were all
provided in a manner consistent with established varsity sports.”369 Moreover,
the team’s purpose was “to compete athletically at the intercollegiate level, and
. . . its members were selected for—and remain dedicated to—that purpose.”370
The issue facing the court was whether the further development and changes
implemented in the program subsequent to its 2010 decision were sufficient to
justify a finding that the acro team now constituted a sport whose team members
could be counted as participants for purposes of Title IX.371
i.

Lack of NCAA Recognition.

An initial problem for Quinnipiac was the fact that neither competitive cheer
nor acro was recognized as a championship sport by the NCAA, or even as an
emerging sport.372 Indeed, the recent efforts by the National Collegiate
Acrobatics and Tumbling Association (NCATA), the new name of the former
NCSTA,373 to obtain NCAA recognition for acro as an emerging sport proved
fruitless.374 The initial emerging-sport proposal put forward by the NCATA in
2010 ignited a schism within the competitive cheer community, based on
diverging visions for the activity.375 While the NCATA’s proposed format
emphasized the gymnastic elements of cheer, another faction, led by USA
Cheer, the national governing body for cheerleading, submitted an emerging
sport proposal of its own, based on a “rival format called ‘STUNT,’ which
place[d] greater emphasis on the performance-based aspects of traditional
cheerleading competitions.”376 Faced with competing proposals, the NCAA
Committee for Women’s Athletics (CWA), the organization responsible for
368. Id. at 454.
369. Id.; see also id. at 422 n.9.
370. Id. at 455.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 421, 423. As discussed, an emerging sport is “a provisional designation that allows a
university to count the activity toward NCAA revenue distribution and minimum sports sponsorship
requirements.” Id. at 421; see also supra note 251. This designation “encourage[s] schools to increase
sports opportunities and create NCAA championships in these new sports.” Hogshead-Makar, supra
note 228, at 469. As of the 2015–2016 season, acro is still not listed as an emerging sport. See NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 251, art. 20.02.4(a)–(b).
373. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 423.
374. Id. at 424.
375. Id.
376. Id.; see also Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 457. For a detailed discussion of the differences
between the two proposals, see Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 456–58.
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determining whether an activity receives provisional recognition as an
emerging sport, held both proposals in abeyance and instructed the two rival
organizations to resolve their differences.377 Unfortunately, the NCATA and
USA Cheer were unable to reach agreement and once again submitted
competing proposals to the CWA in 2011.378
Due to this discord, the court believed that “acro’s prospects of qualifying
as an NCAA emerging sport in the foreseeable future have dimmed
considerably since 2010.”379 The rivalry between NCATA and USA Cheer
“means that the structure of this nascent sport will remain in flux, as some
schools adopt one format while others adopt the competing format.”380 This
was particularly problematic because at least twenty schools must offer varsity
or competitive club teams in the activity before it can be recognized as an
emerging sport.381 Due to competition from USA Cheer, only six universities
sponsored acro teams during the 2011–2012 season, too few to support acro as
an emerging sport.382 For 2012–2013, one of those six schools decided to
cancel its acro team, while two others planned to sponsor acro teams.383 Even
for the 2013–2014 season, only three additional schools provided letters of
commitment, bringing the total to, at most, ten participating schools.384
Not only had the NCAA failed to classify competitive cheer or acro as
either a championship or emerging sport, but DOE did not recognize it as a sport
either, meaning schools reporting their athletic participation data under the
EADA could not report their rosters “unless they have received a letter from the
[OCR] determining that their cheer squads are legitimately engaged in sport.”385
And, of course, “[t]o date, the agency has never issued a letter counting
cheerleading or acro as a varsity sport.”386
377. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 424.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.; see Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 456. There must also “be other evidence of potential interest
in a college-level competition.” Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 456 (citing CRITERIA FOR EMERGING
SPORTS, supra note 133). Such evidence may take the form of “high participation rates in college
intramurals, high school teams, or non-scholastic competitive teams, and support from governing
bodies, conferences, the U.S. Olympic Committee, and professional organizations.” Id. (citing
CRITERIA FOR EMERGING SPORTS, supra note 133).
382. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 424–25. By contrast, fifteen collegiate club teams agreed to
compete under the auspices of the USA Cheer format. Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 457.
383. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 425.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 421–22.
386. Id. at 422. Quinnipiac decided not to seek such a letter following an earlier letter from OCR
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In sum, acro was still not entitled to a presumption that it should be
considered a sport because it was still not recognized by the NCAA as a
championship sport or an emerging sport.387 Thus, Quinnipiac had the burden
of proving that acro satisfied the factors listed in the 2008 OCR Letter.388 Not
only did it have this burden, but Quinnipiac also had to overcome OCR’s
presumption against treating cheer-based activities as a sport under Title IX, as
established by the 2000 OCR Letters.389 The school’s failure to overcome this
presumption constituted a significant hurdle to its claim that acro should be
considered a sport.
Before even turning to the other factors, the court found the lack of
recognition as a sport by the NCAA and OCR alone was “sufficient to tip the
balance against treating an athletic endeavor as an authentic varsity ‘sport’ for
purposes of prong one.”390 Without such recognition, “acro lacks what every
other varsity men’s team sponsored by Quinnipiac enjoys: the chance to
participate in an NCAA-sponsored championship.”391 And where
a school chooses to sponsor an athletics program at the
highest level of competition (NCAA Division I), and offers all
of its male athletes the opportunity to participate in
NCAA-championship sports, the lack of NCAA recognition for
a single women’s sport within that program raises a significant
gender-equity issue if the school hopes to count that
unreconized sport toward compliance with Title IX. So long as
Quinnipiac chooses to hold itself out as a Division I
institution, providing a full slate of NCAA-recognized sports
for men, equity demands that it do the same for women.392
This was due to the fact that, as the plaintiff’s expert testified, “the
experience NCAA championships provide is considered ‘the top of the
mountain’ by student athletes, and championships sponsored ‘by other
to the athletic director of the University of Maryland, expressing skepticism as to whether competitive
cheer satisfied several factors necessary to be counted toward Title IX compliance. See Letter from
Linda C. Barrett, Team Leader, Office for Civil Rights, to Deborah A. Yow, Dir. of Athletics, Univ. of
Md. (May 8, 2003) (on file with Author).
387. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 455.
391. Id. at 423–24.
392. Id. at 455.
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organizations don’t have the same financial resources, and the quality of
experience is not the same.’”393
Moreover, the CWA—“the undisputed authority on intercollegiate sports
for women, and the source from which the OCR’s presumption in favor of
recognized emerging sports arises”—specifically reviewed the competing
emerging sport proposals and determined that the competing organizations must
first settle their differences before recognition as an emerging sport could be
given.394 Thus, the CWA effectively determined that acro was not yet ready “to
be recognized on its own as an emerging sport, at least until the internal
divisions within the former competitive-cheer community are resolved.”395 “So
long as acknowledged authorities in intercollegiate athletics decline to
recognize acro as an authentic varsity sport, courts should hesitate before doing
otherwise.”396 “For this reason alone,” the court concluded that Quinnipiac had
not overcome the presumption against treating acro as a sport for purposes of
Title IX.397
ii. Intrinsic Factors.
Notwithstanding the lack of recognition as a sport by the NCAA and OCR,
the court also held that Quinnipiac continued to run afoul of the same factors set
forth in the 2008 OCR Letter that proved fatal to its argument back in 2010.398
Among the intrinsic factors identified by OCR as relevant to finding that an
activity constitutes a sport, the court previously identified the shortcomings of
the competitive cheer team related to areas
fundamental to intercollegiate varsity sports, such as: whether
competition is judged by a consistent set of rules; whether the
number of competitions and length of play are determined by a
governing athletics organization; whether the activity has a
defined season; and whether post-season competition is
dependent on regular season results.399
Quinnipiac argued that as a result of the changes it made to correct the
393. Id. at 424.
394. Id. at 455.
395. Id. at 455–56.
396. Id. at 456.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
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deficiencies identified by the court, its competitive cheer or acro program should
now be considered a sport.400
The court acknowledged that the team’s regular season benefited “from
more consistency in the rules of play and the quality of opponents.”401 After
changing its name, the NCATA “developed into a more cohesive governing
body with its own set of bylaws, rules, and policies.”402 It partnered with USA
Gymnastics, which now sanctions all NCATA competitions.403 As a result, all
of the acro team’s meets during the 2010–2011 and 2011–2012 seasons were
governed by a consistent set of rules and the team “competed solely against
college-level varsity opponents.”404
The opportunity for a genuine postseason championship also improved for
the acro team. Beginning with the 2010–2011 season, the team participated in
a progressive-style championship, sponsored by NCATA, under the same rules
that governed its regular season play.405 Moreover, teams were seeded based on
their regular season results.406
However, “despite these incremental improvements in structure,
administration, and scheduling,” the court found that “crucial elements of
Quinnipiac’s acro program remain unchanged and continue to distinguish the
team from other Division I varsity sports.”407 First, the ongoing rift between the

400. Id. at 422.
401. Id. at 423.
402. Id.
403. Id. In conjunction with this partnership, NCATA “solidified some key features of its sport
including size of squads (no more tha[n] forty), number of regular season competitions (six to eight),
meet format (six rounds—compulsory, stunt, pyramid, basket toss, tumbling, and a team routine), and
scoring (pre-determined start difficulty values for each skill in each round).” Buzuvis, supra note 13,
at 457 (citing NCATA: NCSTA Will Sanction Events Through USA Gymnastics, SPIRIT CO. (Sept. 2,
2010), http://spiritcompany.com/2010/09/ncata-ncsta-will-sanction-events-through-usa-gymnastics/).
The result was “a new, competitive discipline that is separate from sideline cheerleading and focused
on competition based on accuracy and synchronous execution of physical skills,” with “a competitive
structure that is far more extensive and more tailored to the competitive purpose of sport than” what
previously existed. Id. at 458.
404. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 423. In the 2010–2011 season, Quinnipiac’s acro team competed
in six competitions and a national championship. Id. at 423 n.12. In the 2011–2012 season, the team
competed in ten competitions and a national championship. Id. The team thus participated in more
competitions per season than had been the case at the time of the district court’s 2010 decision. See
Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 460.
405. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 423; see also Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 456–57. These rules are
“designed to compare each team’s technical and synchronous execution of stunts and maneuvers along
objective, predetermined criteria,” rather than “‘crowd response’ and incorporation of spirit props.”
Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 460.
406. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 423; Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 460.
407. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 423.
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NCATA and USA Cheer meant that “the rules, competitive format, and
structure” of the activity remained in flux, “as some teams gravitate toward one
iteration of the sport while others gravitate toward competing iterations.”408
Until consensus could be reached between the two formats, “acro’s format will
be subject to modification,” and no other varsity sport at Quinnipiac “risks
training under a competitive format that is subject to change as rival factions
battle over how the sport ultimately will be defined.”409
Furthermore, while the NCATA national championship seeded teams based
on their regular season results, “due to the extraordinarily small number of
schools sponsoring acro, the NCATA’s national championship remains open to
each and every acro team in the country.”410 There was “no progressive playoff
system or entrance qualification, such as a minimum win tally over the course
of [a] season.”411 Nor did such a playoff system seem feasible in the foreseeable
future.412 No other varsity sport at Quinnipiac received “an automatic bid to
nationals; a free pass that dilutes the experience compared to legitimate
post-season competition.”413 Accordingly, despite certain improvements, the
intrinsic factors counseling against a determination that competitive cheer or
acro constituted a sport in 2010 continued to weigh against such a finding in
2012.
iii.

Extrinsic Factors.

The extrinsic factors identified by the court in its original decision related
to “whether an athletic activity is administered by the university in manner [sic]
consistent with bona fide varsity sports” and included
whether participants are recruited in a manner consistent with
other varsity sports; whether competitive opportunities differ
quantitatively or qualitatively from established varsity sports;
whether the competitive schedule reflects the abilities of the
team; and whether the team participates in pre-season or
post-season competition in a manner consistent with other

408. Id. at 456.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id.
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varsity sports.414
The court conceded that the acro team “has seen discernible improvements
with respect to each of these factors” and “Quinnipiac has come closer to
meeting its burden of proof.”415 The team’s head coach began off-campus
recruiting in June 2010 and tailored her recruitment efforts to NCAA
standards.416 Further, the team competed exclusively against collegiate varsity
opponents over the past two seasons.417 Ultimately, however, despite these
improvements, the acro program still fell short in certain particulars.418
First, while the head coach of the acro program could now recruit off
campus, her recruitment strategies differed from those of every other varsity
team at Quinnipiac.419 She “could not recruit athletes based on their mastery of
acro’s specific competitive format, because no high school in the country
currently sponsors an acro program of its own.”420 The coach, therefore, was
forced to seek out athletes “with a patchwork of skill sets derived from diverse
athletic backgrounds, including cheerleading, gymnastics, acrobatics and other
sports,”421 in the hopes that “skills honed in those sports would be transferable
to acro.”422 Because none of these athletes had ever competed in the sport of
acro, unlike the coaches of every other varsity team at Quinnipiac, the acro
coach “could only know by inference and guesswork what other coaches knew
for sure: whether a particular athlete competes effectively in the sport for which
she is being recruited.”423 Thus, “recruitment for acro differed both
quantitatively and qualitatively from every other varsity sport in the
University’s athletics program.”424
Furthermore, while the team competed exclusively against collegiate
varsity competition, “there are still far too few acro programs in existence to
provide genuine intercollegiate competition on the varsity level.”425 This

414. Id. at 457.
415. Id. at 456–57.
416. Id. at 422–23.
417. Id. at 425, 457.
418. Id. at 457.
419. Id. at 425, 457.
420. Id. at 457.
421. Id. at 425.
422. Id. at 457.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
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resulted in “significant variation in the declared division level among those
opponents.”426 During the 2011–2012 season, for example, there were only six
acro teams nationwide.427 No other varsity team at Quinnipiac played “such a
tiny universe of opponents.”428 Of those five opponents, only three were
members of NCAA Division I, while one belonged to NCAA Division II, and
one belonged to the NAIA.429 Indeed, of the acro team’s ten regular
season competitions during the 2011–2012 season, only six involved fellow
NCAA Division I members, meaning that “forty percent of [its] regular season
meets were against teams below [its] declared division level.”430 Not one of
Quinnipiac’s men’s teams played a single regular-season contest against a
below-division opponent that year.431
In sum, the changes Quinnipiac implemented in connection with its
competitive cheer or acro team were not enough to overcome the presumption
against treating the activity as a sport.432 Based on “the lack of recognition by
the NCAA, the ongoing rivalry with [USA Cheer], the sport’s unconventional
recruiting difficulties, and the team’s inadequate regular-season and
post-season competition,” Quinnipiac’s acro team still could not be considered
a varsity sport for purposes of Title IX.433
b. Women’s Rugby.
Having reaffirmed its earlier conclusion that competitive cheerleading or
acro did not constitute a sport for purposes of Title IX, the court next turned its
attention to Quinnipiac’s newly developed women’s rugby team, which, it
believed, “present[ed] a closer question.”434 Although Quinnipiac only began
426. Id. at 425.
427. Id. at 457.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 425. The NAIA school Azusa Pacific University has since reclassified to NCAA Division
II. Joe Reinsch, Azusa Pacific Recommended for Full NCAA Division II Membership, AZUSA PAC.
ATHLETICS (July 11, 2014), http://www.apu.edu/athletics/stories/22124.
430. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 425, 457.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 455.
433. Id. at 458. The court, however, was careful to note that, because Quinnipiac chose to rely
exclusively on the substantial proportionality prong of the three-prong test, its decision that competitive
cheerleading or acro did not count toward compliance with Title IX was confined to that prong—“the
only prong in which an assessment of substantial proportionality in ‘intercollegiate level participation
opportunities’ is required.” Id. at 458. The court refused to foreclose the possibility that, “under
different circumstances, a university’s sponsorship of a varsity-level acro program could count toward
compliance under prongs two or three.” Id.
434. Id.
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sponsoring women’s rugby for the 2011–2012 season, the sport of rugby itself
has been played for at least 175 years.435 Indeed, rugby is recognized by the
NCAA as an emerging sport, which means that it is subject to many of the same
structural and administrative requirements as NCAA championship sports, may
be counted by sponsoring schools “toward membership minimums and revenue
distribution under NCAA regulations[,]” and is entitled to a presumption that it
provides its athletes the opportunity to participate in an intercollegiate varsity
sport for purposes of Title IX.436
At the same time, however, the court noted various considerations
supporting a conclusion that the presumption afforded to rugby as an emerging
sport should not be given much weight.437 Pursuant to NCAA rules, an
emerging sport may lose its status “if, after a period of ten years, it fails to add
enough varsity teams to make adequate progress toward promotion to
NCAA-championship status.”438 At that time, rugby was on the list of
emerging sports for ten years, and only five schools, including Quinnipiac,
sponsored it as a varsity sport.439 Based on the low number of schools
sponsoring varsity women’s rugby—far fewer than the number of schools
sponsoring other emerging sports, that had been stripped of their status in the
past for lack of growth440—“rugby risks losing recognition as an emerging sport
in the very near future.”441 Due to its precarious position, the court
believed that the presumption afforded under the 2008 OCR Letter by NCAA
recognition “[wa]s weakened in this case; rugby may be recognized today, but
not tomorrow.”442 Accordingly, “under the unique circumstances of this case,
the presumption in favor of counting Quinnipiac’s rugby program for Title IX
purposes [wa]s entitled to considerably less weight.”443 The court then turned
its sights to whether this weak presumption was effectively rebutted, based on
the intrinsic and extrinsic factors set forth in the 2008 OCR Letter.444
435. Id. at 425.
436. Id. at 426, 458–59.
437. Id. at 426–27.
438. Id. at 426–27.
439. Id. at 427. Moreover, of those five schools, Quinnipiac was the only one to add rugby since it
was granted emerging sport status. Id.
440. Women’s squash was stripped of emerging sport status when, after ten years, only forty-eight
schools sponsored a varsity team, while synchronized swimming lost its status with eleven
school-sponsored teams, badminton with fifteen teams, and archery with eight. Id. at 427 n.18.
441. Id. at 459. Despite the court’s misgivings, rugby is still listed as an emerging sport as of the
2015–2016 academic year. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 251, art. 20.02.4(a).
442. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 458.
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Intrinsic Factors.

The court believed that the various intrinsic factors favored a finding that
women’s rugby constituted a sport for Title IX purposes.445 Rugby had been
played in its current form for over a century and “plainly possesses the intrinsic
qualities of an authentic sport.”446 “Without a doubt, rugby’s purpose is
athletic competition, its contests are governed by a uniform set of rules, its
players are selected for their ruthless athleticism, and its competitive season and
length of play are all well settled.”447 A national governing body—USA
Rugby—“sponsor[ed] an annual post-season tournament in which member
teams compete[d] based on their regular-season results.”448 Even “plaintiffs
concede[d] that rugby is unquestionably [a] ‘sport,’ and . . . capable of providing
genuine athletic participation opportunities.”449 The issue, however, was not
merely whether Quinnipiac’s women’s rugby team was “capable of providing
. . . genuine [athletic] participation opportunit[ies]” in the context of a sport,
but whether the school administered the program as an intercollegiate-level
sport on par with its other varsity sports teams and conducted it in a manner that
satisfied the various extrinsic factors set forth in the 2008 OCR Letter.450
ii.

Extrinsic Factors.

Certain extrinsic factors also supported a finding that Quinnipiac’s
women’s rugby team provided genuine intercollegiate-level athletic
participation opportunities within the context of a sport for purposes of Title IX.
The team received “many of the same benefits that established varsity teams
receive, such as professional coaching, support services, practice
opportunities, scholarships and awards, and an annual budget tailored to the
needs of the team.”451 Also, the head coach of the women’s rugby team was
qualified to recruit off campus from an early stage.452 Notwithstanding these
findings, however, the court concluded that the Quinnipiac women’s rugby team
“lacked [other] extrinsic qualities required to provide its . . . athletes with
participation opportunities on par with other [NCAA] Division I . . . sports.”453

445. Id. at 457–58.
446. Id. at 459.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 426.
453. Id. at 459.
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Of greatest concern to the court were various factors related to team
competition, including
(1) whether competitive opportunities differ quantitatively or
qualitatively from established varsity sports, including
“whether the team competes against intercollegiate or
interscholastic varsity opponents in a manner consistent with
established varsity sports”; and (2) whether the activity
provides an opportunity for athletes to participate in pre-season
or post-season competition in a manner consistent with other
varsity sports, including “whether state, national and/or conference championships exist for the activity.”454
The court determined that the Quinnipiac women’s rugby team fell short on
both the listed factors.455
The court first found that “rugby’s competitive schedule differed both
quantitatively and qualitatively from other varsity sports.”456 Every other
varsity team at Quinnipiac—even the acro team—played a full schedule of
varsity competition.457 However, only four other colleges in the country
sponsored varsity women’s rugby teams.458 Therefore, of the ten regular
season contests on Quinnipiac’s schedule for the 2011–2012 season, six were
against non-varsity club teams and only four were against varsity
opponents.459 Moreover, of the four other varsity programs Quinnipiac
competed against, only one (Eastern Illinois University) was a member of
NCAA Division I.460 Thus, even if Quinnipiac played a full varsity schedule,
there was a single competitor in the entire country at its same division level.461

454. Id. at 460 (quoting Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 100–01 (D. Conn. 2010));
Monroe, supra note 14.
455. Id. at 461.
456. Id. at 460.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 426.
459. Id. at 426, 460. “[C]lub teams [generally] operate at a lower level of competition and receive
less institutional support than do varsity teams.” Id. at 426. They “typically receive little or no funding
from a school’s athletic program, and must seek out alternative sources of support from student
government or recreation departments to supply coaching, equipment, and training.” Id.
460. Id. One other school (West Chester University) was a member of NCAA Division II, while
the remaining two schools (Bowdoin College and Norwich University) were members of NCAA
Division III. Id. at 426 n.16.
461. Id. at 460 n.51.
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The court deemed “[s]uch diminished competitive opportunity . . . inconsistent
with a varsity program at an NCAA Division I institution.”462 Thus, for
purposes of this factor, “Quinnipiac’s rugby team does not presently provide
female athletes with genuine ‘intercollegiate level participation opportunities,’
equivalent to other Division I varsity teams,” and “[t]hat will not change until,
at the very minimum, a majority of its competitions are scheduled against
varsity-level opponents.”463 So long as Quinnipiac offers every other varsity
team a full schedule of varsity competition, “it must do substantially the same
for rugby—at least if it hopes to count its rugby program toward compliance
with prong one.”464
The court also found that the rugby team lacked the opportunity to play in
any postseason competition during the 2011–2012 season, “let alone
participate “in a manner consistent with established varsity sports.”465 First, no
other school in Quinnipiac’s conference466 sponsored a women’s rugby team, so
it had to compete “in a separate regional league known as the Metropolitan New
York Rugby Football Union (“Metro NY”), which operate[d] under the auspices
of USA Rugby.”467 Every other team competing in Metro NY was a collegiate
club program.468 Even within this regional league, Quinnipiac “could not avail
itself of [any] post-season opportunities.”469 First, an ice storm forced
cancellation of the Metro NY regional playoffs, which were not rescheduled.470
Second, notwithstanding the ice storm, Quinnipiac already decided to skip the
regional playoffs, due to a scheduling conflict with two varsity opponents and
safety concerns regarding the potential of having to play matches on three

462. Id. at 460.
463. Id. at 461.
464. Id.
465. Id. (quoting Monroe, supra note 14).
466. At the time of the court’s decision, all of Quinnipiac’s other varsity teams, with the exception
of acro, competed in the Northeast Conference (“NEC”). Id. at 427. Beginning with the 2013–2014
academic year, Quinnipiac’s sports teams began competing in the Metro Atlantic Athletic Conference.
Quinnipiac
University
Joins
the
MAAC,
MAACSPORTS
(Dec.
14,
2012),
http://www.maacsports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=205825230.
467. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 427; see also id. at 461. Beginning with the 2012–2013 season,
the rugby team would compete in the Tri-State Conference, still under the auspices of USA Rugby. Id.
at 427 n.19.
468. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
469. Id. at 461. “USA Rugby sponsor[ed] its own national collegiate championship.” Id. at 427.
A team had to win its regional playoffs, and then its conference championship, to qualify for the national
tournament. Id.
470. Id. at 427, 461. Metro NY simply sent its highest ranked team, which was not Quinnipiac, to
the conference tournament. Id. at 427–28.
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straight days.471
Based on these findings, the court felt compelled to conclude that, “[i]f
Quinnipiac is serious about sponsoring women’s rugby as a Division I varsity
sport, it should not tolerate its team competing in a region in which
post-season championships are, in the Coach’s estimation, too dangerous to
win.”472 On top of this, even if the team participated in the postseason
tournaments, its competition would consist entirely of club teams.473 The only
point at which it might encounter another varsity team would be in the national
championship itself, assuming that one of the other four varsity programs also
managed to qualify.474 Accordingly, “rugby is unlike any other established
varsity team at Quinnipiac: all other teams—with the exception of acro—
compete in NEC and NCAA-sponsored tournaments against a full slate of
varsity competitors.”475
In sum, based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
2011–2012 season, the court concluded that “Quinnipiac should not be
permitted to count its nascent rugby program among the University’s
intercollegiate-level varsity sports for purposes of prong one.”476 While there
was no question that rugby had all the intrinsic qualities of a sport, “the
manner in which Quinnipiac’s rugby program was administered in its inaugural
season ultimately deprived female participants of the competitive opportunities
essential to a genuine varsity experience.”477 Specifically,
[T]he rugby team’s majority club competition in the regular
season, the absence of any potential varsity competition in the
regional and/or conference post-season, and the team’s
inability to compete for a regional, conference, or national
championship due to safety concerns with the regional
tournament’s current format are sufficient, in the aggregate, to
overcome the presumption in favor of counting rugby’s

471. Id. at 428, 461. While the team could conceivably avoid any scheduling conflicts in the future,
the court found that the safety concerns “effectively foreclose[] any chance of the team competing for
USA Rugby’s national championship, at least until Metro NY modifies the tournament’s format.” Id.
at 461.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id. at 461–62.
475. Id. at 462.
476. Id.
477. Id.
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participants for Title IX purposes.478
2. Substantial Proportionality
Once all of the participation opportunities are counted, the next step is to
determine whether athletic opportunities at the school are substantially
proportionate to the percentages of male and female undergraduate enrollment
at the school. For the 2011–2012 academic year, Quinnipiac “had an
undergraduate enrollment of 5,988 students, of which 2,253 (or 37.6%) were
male, and 3,735 (or 62.4%) were female.”479 Based on its own figures,
Quinnipiac asserted that it had 489 total athletes, of which 168, or 34.4%, were
male, and 321, or 65.6%, were female.480 If these numbers were accurate, not
only would Quinnipiac’s athletic participation rates be substantially
proportional, but they would be slightly over-weighted in favor of females.481
However, the court’s determination that neither acro nor women’s rugby
provided genuine athletic participation opportunities meant that none of the
members of those teams could be included in the tally.482 This resulted in the
removal of sixty-seven female athletes from Quinnipiac’s count, leaving it with
only 254 female athletes.483
Using these figures, only 60.2% of
Quinnipiac’s athletes were female, while females comprised 62.4% of the
school’s undergraduate enrollment, a disparity of 2.2%.484
The court then decided whether the 2.2% disparity was significant enough
478. Id. Again, however, the court was quick to limit the potential reach of its holding. See id. The
court acknowledged that emerging sports, such as rugby, “by definition, require an incubation period
in which to grow and develop, and that during that period first-generation varsity teams will inevitably
spend a portion of their regular seasons competing against club teams to round out their schedules.” Id.
However, even if participants in emerging sports under those circumstances could never be counted for
purposes of prong one (a conclusion the court denied reaching) that does not mean emerging sports
may never count for anything under Title IX. Id. The court deemed it “all but certain that sponsorship
of emerging sports could count toward compliance under prongs two or three.” Id. Quinnipiac, again,
defended itself only under the substantial proportionality prong (prong one) of the three-prong test. Id.
at 463. Therefore, while the court “conclude[d] that participants in Quinnipiac’s rugby program may
not be counted for purposes of prong one,” the court’s holding “by no means precludes the possibility
that, under different procedural circumstances, a school’s sponsorship of women’s rugby would count
for purposes of prongs two or three.” Id.
479. Id. at 431.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. See id. at 466.
483. Id. Of the sixty-seven female athletes removed from the tally, thirty-six were members of the
acro team, twenty-eight were members of the rugby team, and three were indoor track runners who quit
the team less than half-way through the regular season. Id.
484. Id.
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to take Quinnipiac out of compliance with the substantial proportionality prong.
Some courts previously found “that a disparity below two percentage points is
proof that an educational institution falls within the substantial
proportionality safe harbor,” making a 2.2% disparity a very close case in
numerical terms.485 However, according to the 1996 Clarification, “raw
numbers are only part of the analysis for whether the participation of women in
a school’s varsity program is proportional to enrollment.”486 The court also
considered “whether natural fluctuations in enrollment contributed to the lack
of proportionality, and whether the number of athletic participation
opportunities needed to achieve exact proportionality would be sufficient to
sustain a viable athletic team.”487
As to the first consideration, Quinnipiac “introduced no evidence . . . to
suggest that natural fluctuations in enrollment—or unanticipated drops in
female athletic participation—were to blame for [the] disparity in athletic
opportunities.”488 Indeed, the school carefully selected its teams’ roster targets
and “continued to take steps to ensure that [those] targets were met over the
course of the year.”489 As to the second consideration, “the 2.2 percent
disparity represent[ed] a shortfall of . . . twenty-five female athletes,” enough to
sustain an additional varsity team.490 Indeed, the established women’s
volleyball team the school was trying to eliminate had a roster of only fourteen
athletes.491 In sum, the 2.2% disparity demonstrated that Quinnipiac still “failed
to allocate athletic participation opportunities in numbers substantially
proportionate to its undergraduate female population,” and had “not yet brought
itself into compliance with Title IX’s effective-accommodation mandate.”492
3. The Levels-of-Competition Test
While many of the issues resolved by the court in connection with its
analysis of the substantial proportionality prong were novel in their own right,
the court proceeded to place an additional gloss on its decision, one that few, if

485. Id. at 466–67 (citing Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 682–83
(W.D. Va. 2009)).
486. Id. at 467.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id.
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any, prior decisions addressed.493
As discussed previously, effective
accommodation of student interests and abilities under Title IX entails both
equity in athletic opportunities and equity in levels of competition.494 The
three-part test determines whether a school met its obligations to provide
equitable athletic opportunities between genders, while a separate two-part test
determines whether equity between genders in levels of competition exists.495
In its 2010 decision, the court concluded that Quinnipiac failed to satisfy the
first prong of the three-prong test for determining equity in athletic
opportunities, so it did not have to consider the issue of equity in levels of
competition.496 Now, however, plaintiffs argued that, even if Quinnipiac was in
compliance with the three-part test, it independently failed the two-part
levels-of-competition test.497 Therefore, the court needed to interpret and
apply this standard as well.498
To reiterate, the two prongs of the levels of competition test focus on the
following:
(1) Whether the competitive schedules for men’s and
women’s teams, on a program-wide basis, afford proportionally
similar numbers of male and female athletes equivalently
advanced competitive opportunities; or
(2) Whether the institution can demonstrate a history and
continuing practice of upgrading the competitive opportunities
available to the historically disadvantaged sex as warranted by
developing abilities among the athletes of that sex.499
In the present litigation, Quinnipiac submitted no evidence regarding its
historical allocation of athletic opportunities under the second prong, meaning
that its compliance with the levels-of-competition requirement centered solely
on whether it met the first prong.500 Unfortunately, the court lamented, while
“the OCR has published multiple letters clarifying the scope and effect of the
493. See id. at 435.
494. See discussion supra pp. 542–45.
495. Id. at 437.
496. Id.
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. POLICY INTERPRETATION, supra note 25; see also Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998
F.2d 824, 829 (10th Cir. 1993); Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 439.
500. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 439–40.
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three-part
test, and
the
‘substantial-proportionality’
prong in
particular. . . . [T]he same cannot be said of the levels-of-competition test.”501
OCR provided “almost no additional direction” on the test.502 Indeed, in three
decades since the Policy Interpretation was promulgated, OCR never, to the
court’s knowledge, “issued any official policy clarifying the significance of this
test or how it should be applied.”503 That being said, OCR continued to reiterate
that effective accommodation must be assessed under both the three-prong test
and the levels-of-competition test, so the test remained relevant.504 The court
would have to make do with what little guidance it could find.
In the absence of official sources providing guidance on the
levels-of-competition test, the court turned to OCR’s Investigator’s Manual,
“the only interpretive compass at [its] disposal.”505 The Investigator’s Manual
is an internal OCR document designed to “assist OCR personnel in conducting
investigations and compliance reviews in the field.”506 It “was not subject to
public notice and comment . . . was never formally published. . . . [And] is not
an official interpretation of either Title IX or the 1979 Policy
Interpretation.”507 Therefore, the court held that it was “not entitled to the same
level of deference accorded the [1975] [R]egulations . . . Policy
Interpretation, or . . . OCR policy letters.”508 It was entitled to respect only to
the extent of its power to persuade.509 If any inconsistencies existed between
the Investigator’s Manual and the Policy Interpretation, the Policy Interpretation
would control.510
The Investigator’s Manual provided the following methodology for
assessing compliance with the first prong of the levels-of-competition test:
501. Id. at 440.
502. Id. at 446.
503. Id. (emphasis added). The court suspected that the reason “the levels-of-competition test is
seldom used today and rarely if ever litigated” had to do with “evolving NCAA standards on
competitive scheduling among member schools.” Id. Currently, “the NCAA imposes strict procedures
governing the competitive schedules of men’s and women’s NCAA-championship sports, permitting
only limited competition below declared division levels.” Id. Thus, “modern NCAA rules have all but
eliminated the problem that the levels-of-competition test was designed to address—at least among
schools that offer both sexes the full panoply of NCAA-championship sports.” Id. at 446–47. However,
“a sizable percentage” of Quinnipiac’s athletic program “include[d] non-NCAA-championship sports,”
meaning that the levels-of-competition test was back in play. Id. at 447.
504. Id. at 446.
505. Id. at 447.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id. at 448.
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COMPARE the number of competitive events for each team at
the institution’s declared competitive level. USE the attached
chart for this comparison.
DETERMINE the overall
percentage of men’s and women’s events below the declared
division level or classification. If this analysis results in
relative equivalence, then the second factor [prong two], as
discussed below, need not be considered. If there is a
significant difference in the number of competitive events for
men and women at the institution’s declared competitive
level, ASK the appropriate institution for an explanation. If
there is any concern that the explanation is not satisfactory,
consider the second factor.511
The court found persuasive the Investigator’s Manual’s focus on the
division level of opponents as a proxy for competitive prowess but remained
unpersuaded by its approach to determine proportional similarity, which it
found to conflict with the plain language of the Policy Interpretation.512 This
was due to the Investigator’s Manual’s “proportional comparison of events to
competition level,” while the levels-of-competition test itself expressly calls for
a “proportional comparison of athletes to competition level.”513 Because the
Investigator’s Manual’s approach could not be squared with the express
language of the Policy Interpretation, the court did not owe it deference.514 The
court modified the analysis to “compare the percentage of ‘competitive
opportunities’ afforded to male and female athletes below their declared
division level,” rather than comparing the number of events.515
The court’s analysis proceeded in four steps. First, the court multiplied “the
number of team ‘events’ against division-level opponents by the number of
participants on each team involved,” to “calculate the total number of
‘competitive opportunities’ afforded to the members of each team at their
declared division level.”516 Second, the court multiplied “the number of team
‘events’ against non-division-level opponents by the number of participants on
511. Id. (quoting VALERIE BONNETTE & LAMAR DANIEL, TITLE IX ATHLETICS INVESTIGATOR’S
MANUAL 26 (1990)).
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id. at 449.
515. Id.
516. Id.
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each team involved,” to “calculate the number of ‘competitive opportunities’
below the declared division level.”517 Third, the court “add[ed] up the total
number of division-level and non-division-level competitive opportunities
across all teams for each sex,” to “determine what percentage of overall
competitive opportunities were played against opponents below the school’s
declared division level” for each sex.518 Finally, the court “compar[ed] the
overall percentage of below-division-level competitive opportunities for male
athletes [and] . . . female athletes on a program-wide basis.”519
After applying this formula, the competitive opportunities for male and
female athletes needed to be proportionally similar to satisfy the first prong of
the levels-of-competition test.520 Unfortunately, “[n]either the 1979 Policy
Interpretation nor the Investigator’s Manual specified a threshold percentage
that [would] constitute a violation” of this prong.521 The court decided to give
the proportionally similar phrase “a construction roughly analogous to the
phrase ‘substantial proportionality,’ as used in the first prong of the three-part
test.”522 Thus, exact proportionality was not required, and “whether a
university’s
program-wide
competitive
schedule
violates
the
equivalent-competition prong of the levels-of-competition test should be
determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the totality of the
circumstances.”523
When it came to applying the test, Quinnipiac asserted “that the
competitive schedules provided for female athletes are proportionally similar to
those provided for male athletes, in compliance with the first prong of the
levels-of-competition test.”524 However, “during the 2011–12 academic year,
zero percent of the competitive opportunities Quinnipiac provided to male
athletes were against non-Division I opponents.”525 No men’s team played a
single game against a lower-division opponent.526 On the other hand, “6.3
percent of the competitive opportunities Quinnipiac provided to female
athletes were against non-Division I or non-varsity opponents.”527 This 6.3%
517. Id. (emphasis omitted).
518. Id.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. Id. at 450.
522. Id. at 450–51.
523. Id. at 451.
524. Id. at 453.
525. Id. at 469.
526. Id.
527. Id.
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“disparity in equivalently-advanced competitive opportunities for female
athletes . . . is a direct consequence of the irregular competitive schedule of the
women’s acro and rugby teams.”528
While OCR did not specify a threshold percentage that would constitute a
violation of the first prong of the levels-of-competition test, the court focused
on two facts. First, the rugby “schedule not only contained discrepancies in
division levels among opponents, but discrepancies in their varsity status as
well.”529 The fact that the majority of a women’s team’s schedule consisted of
club opponents, while all male athletes were offered a full varsity schedule at
the highest division level seemed to the court “a particularly egregious
disparity in opportunity.”530 Moreover, the only two teams competing against
below-division opponents—acro and rugby—“represent[ed] two of the four
largest rosters among all women’s teams sponsored” by Quinnipiac.531 This
meant that “an exceptionally large percentage of female athletes were affected
by Quinnipiac’s inequitable allocation of competitive opportunities.”532 Based
on these considerations, the court concluded “that Quinnipiac’s athletic
program, viewed program-wide, failed to provide proportionally-similar
numbers of male and female athletes equivalently-advanced competitive
opportunities in the 2011–2012 academic year.”533 This meant that, even if
women’s acro and women’s rugby constituted sports providing their members
genuine athletic participation opportunities, and even if Quinnipiac was in
compliance with the substantial proportionality prong of the three-part test,
Quinnipiac’s failure to comply with the first prong of the two-part
levels-of-competition test meant that it still violated the effective
accommodation mandate of Title IX.534
In sum, Quinnipiac’s efforts following the district court’s 2010 decision
“failed to demonstrate a significant change in the quantity and/or quality of
athletic participation opportunities provided to its female students.”535 The
school’s continuing failure to satisfy either the substantial proportionality prong
of the three-part test or the first prong of the levels-of-competition test required
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. Id.
532. Id. “[D]uring the 2011–12 academic year, 20 percent of all [of Quinnipiac’s] female athletes
had team schedules in which 40 percent or more of their regular-season competitions were against
non-Division I or non-varsity opponents.” Id.
533. Id. at 469–70.
534. See id. at 467–68, 470–71.
535. Id. at 473.
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the district court’s injunction to be kept in place for the foreseeable future.536
D.

Settlement

Following the district court’s 2013 decision, the parties reached a
settlement in April 2013.537 As part of the settlement, Quinnipiac agreed to keep
all of its existing women’s teams, including the volleyball team.538 Quinnipiac
also agreed to allocate more scholarships to its female athletes and improve the
benefits provided to its women’s teams.539
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF BIEDIGER
The Biediger decisions make a substantial contribution to Title IX
jurisprudence in several novel respects. The cases provide detailed and
thorough guidance on several aspects of Title IX that had not received
significant prior attention from either courts or commentators. In issuing its
2010 decision, the district court became the first federal court to apply “OCR’s
test for whether a sponsored varsity activity can be treated as a sport for
purposes of Title IX.”540 The district court’s 2013 decision also became the first
federal court decision to address the seldom used and rarely litigated
levels-of-competition test.541 Faced with such novel issues, the court
painstakingly traced the relevant legal background, set forth in detail the
limited resources it could find that were directly on point, and made logical
inferences where necessary to apply those resources to the specific facts before
it, facts that no federal court in a Title IX case had previously encountered. As
the Second Circuit found in affirming the district court’s 2010 decision, the
court’s opinion was “comprehensive and well reasoned [sic].”542

536. Id. at 471–72. Of course, as part of the injunction, Quinnipiac had to continue sponsoring a
women’s volleyball team. Id. at 473.
537. Settlement Reached in Quinnipiac Title IX Case, NBC CONN., http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/Settlement-Reached-in-Quinnipiac-Title-IX-Case-204866541.html (last visited
June 9, 2016).
538. Id.
539. Id.
540. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 94 (D. Conn. 2010); see also Biediger, 928
F. Supp. 2d at 452 (“[A]part from my previous decision—and the appeal before the Second C
ircuit—no other court has addressed the OCR’s test for assessing genuine varsity participation
opportunities, and precious few have interpreted Title IX’s effective-accommodation requirement more
generally.”).
541. See Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 446, 452.
542. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Buzuvis, supra note 13,
at 452 (“As a Title IX analysis, Judge Underhill’s decision was appropriate and correct.”).
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Assurance that Athletic Participation Opportunities Remain Genuine in
the Current Economic Climate

The validity of the Biediger decisions is most readily observed in the
context of the economic realities currently facing most intercollegiate athletic
departments. A recent NCAA study determined that only twenty athletics
programs at the Football Bowl Subdivision level (the highest level of
competition within NCAA Division I) turned a profit in 2013.543 A separate
study of NCAA Division II and III schools “found that revenues failed to
exceed expenses [for] every [athletic department] on those levels.”544 These
economic challenges impact Title IX compliance as well. Faced with growing
budgetary concerns, schools are more likely to be inclined to cut sports, rather
than add them. However, “cutting a viable women’s team necessarily violates
the second and third prong[s]” of the three-part test under Title IX.545
Therefore, schools seeking to cut women’s teams would only be able to rely on
the substantial proportionality prong as a defense to any Title IX claim.546 And
“schools unable to add or preserve women’s athletic [participation]
opportunities may be tempted to count women’s opportunities that are
marginally athletic in order to provide the appearance of proportionality.”547
The Biediger court believed that Quinnipiac was attempting to take such a
short cut in its attempts to count competitive cheer or acro and rugby team
members as female participation opportunities for purposes of the substantial
proportionality prong.548 The court noted that “Quinnipiac did nothing to
survey the athletic interests among current or prospective students, but instead
chose to sponsor acro and rugby for economic or strategic reasons, including
the sizable rosters of female athletes that both teams could support.”549
543. Mike Herndon, NCAA Study Finds All but 20 FBS Schools Lose Money on Athletics, AL (Aug.
20, 2014), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2014/08/ncaa_study_finds_all_but_20_fb.html.
544. Id.
545. Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 442. A school can hardly be said to effectively accommodate the
interests and abilities of its female athletes if it seeks to eliminate a healthy women’s varsity team. See
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 904 (1st Cir. 1993).
546. Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 442.
547. Id.
548. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414, 470 (D. Conn. 2013).
549. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 470 n.63; see also Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 460–61 (observing
the justified criticism of “institutions that have prematurely applied the label ‘sport’ to an existing
activity to demonstrate Title IX compliance while avoiding the more costly alternative of adding
traditional sports”); Hogshead-Makar, supra note 228, at 488 (identifying the deceptive practice of
“starting new, cheaper teams for women” as a method for attempting to satisfy Title IX requirements);
Glenn M. Wong et al., NCAA Division I Athletic Directors: An Analysis of the Responsibilities,
Qualifications and Characteristics, 22 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 1, 45 (2015) (characterizing
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Accordingly,
rather than simply recommit to women’s volleyball or bring
other NCAA-championship sports to campus, the University
doubled down on its plan to eliminate volleyball, and staked its
compliance with Title IX on an as-yet unrecognized sport as
well as an emerging sport in imminent danger of losing that
recognition.550
Indeed, had the court endorsed “the meager level of competition that
Quinnipiac’s cheer team experienced in 2009–2010, it would have rendered the
definition of varsity sport dangerously broad.”551 Moreover, while women’s
rugby unquestionably possessed the intrinsic attributes of a sport, issues
regarding its administration and competitive structure still deprived its
participants of a quality athletic experience on par with the experiences of
other varsity athletes.552 The risk in allowing universities to “offer women’s
sports that have minimal competitive structures and call them the equivalent of
highly organized men’s sports,” is that such “backsliding” would inevitably
occur.553 Thus, the Biediger decisions provide an important bulwark against the
temptation of universities to take financial shortcuts toward Title IX
compliance that would not truly provide their female athletes with genuine
intercollegiate athletic participation opportunities.
Of course, it must also be remembered that Biediger did not foreclose the
possibility of competitive cheerleading or acro one day meeting the
requirements of a sport for Title IX purposes. The district court itself had
little doubt that at some point in the near future—once
competitive cheer is better organized and defined, and surely in
the event that the NCAA recognizes the activity as an emerging
sport—competitive cheer will be acknowledged as a bona fide
sporting activity by academic institutions, the public, and the

Quinnipiac’s actions as “a clever attempt to enlarge the definition of female sports for Title IX
purposes.”).
550. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
551. Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 452–53.
552. See Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 462.
553. Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 453. This is due to the fact that “[c]ollege and university athletic
departments do not have a history of voluntarily striving for gender equity, partly because it is
politically and financially difficult to achieve.” Id.
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law.554
The Second Circuit echoed these sentiments, refusing to foreclose the
possibility that competitive cheer, “with better organization and defined rules,
might some day warrant recognition as a varsity sport.”555 Unfortunately, both
courts agreed that that day had not yet arrived.556
Nor has that day likely arrived in the two years since the district court’s
2013 decision. To be sure, further improvements to competitive cheer or acro
have been made. For one thing, the NCATA national championship
tournament is no longer an open invitational, as only the top eight teams in the
country are invited.557 However, the NCATA and USA Cheer still have not
reconciled their differences and both continue to offer competing formats for
competitive cheer. As a result, neither format has yet attained emerging sport
recognition from the NCAA.558 Moreover, issues regarding the competitive
quality of Quinnipiac’s schedules remain. While thirteen schools sponsored
acro teams for the 2015–2016 season, only three were members of NCAA
Division I, including Quinnipiac.559 The same issues plague women’s rugby.

554. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 101 (D. Conn. 2010).
555. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 105 (2d Cir. 2012).
556. Id.; Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 101.
557. See NCATA Announces 2015 Championship Field, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ACROBATICS &
TUMBLING ASS’N (Sept. 30, 2015), http://thencata.org/sports/acro/2014-15/releases/NCATAChamp_TournamentField/. Similarly, the USA Cheer-sponsored STUNT held separate double-elimination tournaments for Division I and Division II programs, in which the four top ranking teams at each
level qualified. See 2015 College STUNT: April Update, USA CHEER, http://usacheer.net/2015collegestunt (last visited June 9, 2016); 2015 STUNT Division I National Championship, C. STUNT,
http://collegestunt.org/2015-season/2015-stunt-national-championship/2015-stunt-division-i-nationalchampionship (last visited June 9, 2016); 2015 STUNT Division II National Championship, C. STUNT,
http://collegestunt.org/2015-season/2015-stunt-national-championship/2015-stunt-division-ii-national-championship (last visited June 9, 2016).
558. See About, C. STUNT, http://collegestunt.org/about-stunt/ (last visited June 9, 2016) (stating
that “USA Cheer is working closely with legal and Title IX experts to ensure that STUNT . . . can
develop into a sport that qualifies for Title IX purposes.”); FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, NAT’L
COLLEGIATE ACROBATICS & TUMBLING ASS’N (Oct. 5, 2015), http://thencata.org/this_is/FAQ (noting
that the NCATA’s mission is to attain emerging sport status); Mission & Vision, NAT’L COLLEGIATE
ACROBATICS & TUMBLING ASS’N (Oct. 5, 2015), http://thencata.org/this_is/missionvision (stating that
“[t]he mission of the NCATA is to bring the sport . . . to NCAA emerging sport status and towards a
fully sanctioned NCAA championship sport.”).
559. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ACROBATICS & TUMBLING ASS’N, http://thencata.org/landing/index (last
visited June 9, 2016). Of the remaining schools, seven are members of Division II, two are members
of Division III, and one is a member of the NAIA. Id. USA Cheer, on the other hand, claims that more
than fifty colleges participated in STUNT over the last five years but did not indicate how many of
these teams were varsity teams, rather than club teams. See 2015 College STUNT: November College
Article, USA CHEER, http://usacheer.net/2015collegestunt (last visited June 9, 2016).

HEFFERAN ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE)

666

6/14/2016 5:34 PM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:2

Twelve varsity women’s rugby teams are participating in the 2015–2016
season, but only six, including Quinnipiac, are members of Division I.560
Thus, despite further improvements, it is unlikely that either competitive
cheer or women’s rugby would be found to constitute sports for Title IX
purposes even today.561 Ultimately, however, when the day does arrive that
competitive cheer and women’s rugby are considered sports under Title IX, the
concerns underlying the Biediger decisions will provide stronger
incentives for those in charge of those activities “to work diligently to
organize, standardize, and increase the competitive opportunities,” resulting, in
the long run, in improved Title IX compliance and benefits to women’s
sports.562
B.

Criticisms

1. Definition of “Sport” Too “Narrow”
Surprisingly, considering the detail and care with which the Biediger courts
made their rulings, the decisions have been subject to criticism from several
commentators. It has been suggested that the courts’ definition of sport and
application of the OCR factors was too narrow. This criticism proceeds along
two main prongs. First, critics suggest that the OCR factors, as applied in
Biediger, fail to “evaluate the athleticism required by an activity in determining
whether it is a genuine athletic opportunity.”563 They assert that while the OCR
test focuses on structure, administration, team preparation, and competition, “it
ignores the requisite skill, strength, and athleticism required of a sport.”564
Critics fear that the standard, as applied in Biediger, will result in “activities

560. NCAA Women’s Rugby, USA RUGBY, http://usarugby.org/ncaa (last visited June 9, 2016).
Two NAIA schools are also sponsoring women’s rugby, with an additional eight schools across
divisions sponsoring club teams. Id.
561. Perhaps, however, recognition will be achieved for competitive cheer in the near future.
“[A]ccording to the National Federation of State High School Associations, approximately 123,000
[high school] students participated in competitive cheer in 2009.” MITTEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 814.
Competitive cheer is “among the fastest growing sports in the country.” Buzuvis, supra note 13, at
445; but see MITTEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 25 (observing that “[p]articipation in competitive cheer
declined” in 2010–11, “after having experienced significant increases in prior years”). Moreover, based
on Quinnipiac’s experiences, it seems that operating costs for competitive cheer and acro are on par
with other women’s sports, which might prevent universities from simply using it “as a quick fix to
Title IX compliance on a budget.” Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 461.
562. Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 454, 464.
563. Kiersten McKoy, Comment, Biediger v. Quinnipiac University, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 457,
461 (2014).
564. Id. at 464.

HEFFERAN ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

A SPORTI NG CHANCE

6/14/2016 5:34 PM

667

requiring little or no physical exertion” satisfying Title IX requirements, as long
as they meet the structure, administration, team preparation, and competition
factors, “while those activities that require just as much, if not more, physical
exertion than current varsity sports (e.g., competitive cheerleading) will not fulfill Title IX requirements.”565 Specifically, the Biediger court is accused of “ignoring the athletic nature of the [sic] competitive cheer and the existence of
competitive events in favor of traditional stereotypes about ‘pom-poms and
looking pretty.’”566 The critics suggest modifying the OCR test to include an
athletic component.567
Contrary to these assertions, no such modification of the test for
determining which activities count as sports for purposes of Title IX is needed.
Neither Biediger nor the OCR test ignores the athletic nature of the activity in
question. The district court and the Second Circuit in Biediger both
specifically acknowledged “that competitive cheerleading can be physically
challenging, requiring competitors to possess ‘strength, agility, and grace.’”568
However, simply requiring physical exertion and athletic skill is not enough,
standing alone, to support a finding that an activity constitutes a sport for
purposes of Title IX—those athletic skills must be utilized in a context
providing their possessors with genuine intercollegiate-level athletic
participation opportunities. Furthermore, the OCR test does account for
physical exertion and athletic skill, at least indirectly. If an activity is
recognized as an emerging sport by the NCAA, it is entitled to a presumption
that it constitutes a sport for purposes of Title IX.569 The NCAA’s Criteria for
Emerging Sports defines a sport as “an institutional activity involving physical
exertion with the purpose of competition versus other teams or individuals
within a collegiate competition structure,” and which “includes regularly
scheduled team and/or individual, head-to-head competition (at least five)
within a defined competitive season(s); and standardized rules with
rating/scoring systems ratified by official regulatory agencies and governing
bodies.”570 Thus, if an activity is classified as an emerging sport, which
565. Id. at 464–65.
566. Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 453.
567. McKoy, supra note 563, at 467–68.
568. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 105 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Biediger v. Quinnipiac
Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 101 (D. Conn. 2010)); see also Sowder et al., supra note 181 (identifying
fitness, endurance, strength, power, agility, and flexibility as physical elements embodied by
cheerleading).
569. See Monroe, supra note 14, at 2.
570. CRITERIA FOR EMERGING SPORTS, supra note 133 (emphasis added); see also Buzuvis, supra
note 13, at 456–57. Of course, the emerging sports framework itself is not above criticism. Some
commentators have suggested that, in practice, the sports that were approved as emerging sports have
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accounts for the physical exertion involved in the activity, it will be presumed
to be a sport for purposes of the OCR test for determining what constitutes a
sport under Title IX.
The other prong of the criticism concerns the comparative approach adopted
by both OCR and the Biediger courts, which “only consider[s] an
activity to be ‘athletic’ if it is similar to already-existing varsity sports.”571
Critics believe that “evaluating whether a newly developed activity has similar
competitive opportunities to existing sports undermines the goal of creating
equal opportunity because teams engaging in new activities cannot survive this
rigorous standard.”572 According to this line of reasoning, upon their
initiation, new activities cannot possibly offer competitive opportunities
comparable to existing sports that had years to develop, so time to invest
resources in these activities is needed before they can hope to satisfy the OCR
test.573 Budgetary restraints, however, may make schools reluctant to invest in
new activities that are not immediately compliant with Title IX.574 Therefore,
new activities that meet the administrative factors of the OCR test should
receive a grace period in which competitive opportunities may grow and
athletes can still be counted toward Title IX compliance.575
No such grace period is needed. Again, this proposal ignores the
implications of attaining emerging sport status, which would help to assuage
concerns regarding recognition of new activities.576 Moreover, even if
emerging sports cannot be counted for purposes of the substantial
proportionality prong—a conclusion the district court assiduously avoided
reaching577—that does not mean they are irrelevant for purposes of Title IX.
The court itself recognized that new activities would “require an incubation

simply constituted the women’s version of an already established men’s sport, rather than a purely
female-driven activity, and have appealed more to women of a higher socioeconomic status. See
MITTEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 776, 801; Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 462–63.
571. See Glatt, supra note 12, at 307.
572. McKoy, supra note 563, at 461.
573. Id. at 465.
574. Id.
575. Id. at 469.
576. OCR itself has expressly stated that its test is designed “to encourage compliance with the Title
IX athletics regulations in a flexible manner that expands, rather than limits, student athletic
opportunities.” Monroe, supra note 14, at 4 (emphasis omitted). The factors are designed “to provide
institutions with information to include new sports in their athletics programs, such as those athletic
activities not yet recognized by governing athletics organizations and those featured at the Olympic
games, if they so choose.” Id.
577. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414, 462 (D. Conn. 2013).
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period in which to grow and develop.”578 The court, therefore, emphasized that
“it seems all but certain that sponsorship of emerging sports could count toward
compliance under prongs two or three.”579 Accordingly, the problem in
Biediger was not the fact that new activities may never be considered in the Title
IX analysis, but that “Quinnipiac has taken a prong-two approach to
solving a prong-one problem.”580 Therefore, even if new activities might not
always be taken into account under the first prong of the three-part test, this is
only because they are more appropriately considered elsewhere in the Title IX
analysis.
2. Deference
Another area of criticism has been the level of deference the Biediger courts
accorded to the various OCR pronouncements. Critics charge that the district
court erroneously “assumed without analysis that the 2008 Letter
interpreted a regulation and thereby qualified for [heightened] Martin
deference.”581 Rather, low-level Skidmore deference should have been
applied, and the 2008 OCR Letter should have been found unpersuasive.582
Again, this criticism misses the mark.
The basis for the assertion that the 2008 OCR Letter is not entitled to
Martin deference appears to be that the 2008 OCR Letter could not have been
interpreting ambiguity in the language of any regulation, because the
applicable regulation under 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) “gives no guidance on the
word ‘athletic,’ merely calling on universities to provide ‘equal athletic
opportunity.’”583
To the contrary, the regulation states that whether
universities provide “equal athletic opportunity” will be determined based on
“[w]hether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes.”584 What is
meant by “sports” remains unclear from the regulation, and it was this
ambiguous language that OCR interpreted in the 2008 OCR Letter, thereby

578. Id.
579. Id. Of course, the district court did not need to make such a finding, as Quinnipiac defended
itself solely on the basis of the substantial proportionality prong. Id. at 458.
580. Id. at 471.
581. Glatt, supra note 12, at 315.
582. See id. at 315–21.
583. Id. at 315–16.
584. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (2016).
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entitling the Letter to heightened Martin deference.585 The Second Circuit subsequently agreed that the OCR Letters were “entitled to substantial
deference.”586 Moreover, the Second Circuit further held that even if the OCR
Letters were not entitled to heightened deference, they would still be entitled to
deference, “because their logical consistency with the . . . Policy
Interpretation amplifies their ‘power to persuade.’”587 Therefore, the Biediger
courts properly deferred to the OCR Letters in reaching their determination.
For all of the above reasons, the criticisms of Biediger fail to withstand
scrutiny. The district court’s well-reasoned decision was correct as a matter of
both law and policy, and its analysis of what constitutes a sport for purposes of
Title IX, as well as the levels-of-competition test, should be the starting point
for all subsequent decisions on these subjects.
V.

CONCLUSION

With the recent victory of the United States Women’s National Team in the
2015 FIFA Women’s World Cup, the impact of Title IX has again been in the
forefront of the news. The importance of providing equal athletic opportunities
to female athletes cannot be understated. However, those athletic opportunities
must be genuine and come within the context of a “sport.” The Biediger
decisions mark the first time that federal courts had the occasion to consider
what constitutes a sport for purposes of compliance with Title IX. Biediger also
represents the first instance in which a federal court interpreted and applied Title
IX’s levels-of-competition test. As illustrated in this Article, the thorough and
complete analyses embodied by the Biediger decisions represent an appropriate
balancing of the relevant factors set forth by OCR. Both the district court and
the Second Circuit properly recognized that adopting too broad a definition of
sport risked watering down women’s sports. The Biediger trilogy therefore
provides an important bulwark against the temptation of universities to take
shortcuts to achieve Title IX compliance when faced with budgetary constraints.
Going forward, the Biediger decisions will help ensure that female athletes
receive genuine intercollegiate-level athletic participation opportunities.

585. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 92–93 (D. Conn. 2010); Monroe, supra
note 14, at 1–2.
586. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 96–97 (2d Cir. 2012). At least one other federal
court has accorded a similar degree of deference to a Dear Colleague Letter, citing the Second Circuit’s
decision in Biediger. See T.E. v. Pine Bush Cent. Sch. Dist., 58 F. Supp. 3d 332, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
587. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 97 (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156,
2169 (2012)).

